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TOWARD A PURE ARBITRAL PARADIGM OF CLASSWIDE
ARBITRATION: ARBITRAL POWER AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION
CAROLE J. BUCKNER t
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent disparate legal developments have transformed the law re-
garding classwide arbitration. These developments swept away the long-
standing prohibition against classwide arbitration (a remnant of the his-
toric mistrust of the arbitral process) and eliminated the "hybrid" model
of classwide arbitration (another remnant, in which the courts remained
involved in the arbitral process). Classwide arbitration is evolving to-
ward a "pure" arbitral paradigm' permitting only the minimal court in-
volvement authorized under the Federal Arbitration Act.2 This article
discusses the developing trend toward a pure arbitral paradigm of class-
wide arbitration that is evident from the United States Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding classwide arbitration and federal preemption and
considers its potential far-reaching implications.
Arbitration has collided with consumer and employment class ac-
tions. The use of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution continues
to increase in a wide variety of contexts.3 At the same time, the majority
of class action cases are damages class actions4 against business defen-
dants. 5  About one-third of these cases arise in either the consumer,
6
commercial or employment contexts, where arbitration remains most
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1. By a "pure" arbitral paradigm, I mean a model permitting the arbitration of class actions,
or "classwide arbitration" that sanctions the involvement of the judicial system only very narrowly,
as contemplated by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2004).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2004).
3. Gabriel Herrmann, Discovering Policy Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 779, 781 (2003); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4-5 (2000) (American Arbitration Association requests increased 21% be-
tween 1994 and 1998); DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION
OF CORPORATE DISPUTES, A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 5
(1998) ("One of the foremost trends in corporate America in the 1990s has been the shift from tradi-
tional litigation and government agency resolution of disputes toward the use of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR).").
4. DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 52 (2000).
5. Id. at 53.
6. Id. at 53-54.
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popular.7  Most "first generation" arbitration clauses8 common in com-
mercial and employment contracts9 are silent regarding the availability of
class action relief in the arbitral setting. 10 Most federal courts1 and
many state courts l2 interpreted these silent arbitration clauses to preclude
classwide or consolidated arbitration. One federal circuit court 13 and
some state courts interpreted these silent arbitration clauses to permit
classwide or consolidated arbitration.14 Some courts permitting classwide
arbitration required ongoing "judicial supervision"-the so-called "hy-
brid" model of classwide arbitration.
5
With its decision in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 16 the United
States Supreme Court implicitly reversed the course of both federal and
state law prohibiting classwide arbitration and significantly expanded
arbitral power to adjudicate class actions.17 In Bazzle, the Supreme Court
held that an arbitrator, not the court, should determine the availability of
classwide arbitration where the parties' arbitration agreement is silent on
the issue,' 8 and further indicated that arbitrators need not necessarily
interpret arbitration agreements that are silent regarding classwide arbi-
7. LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 3, at 14.
8. 1 refer to the "first generation" of arbitration clauses to include clauses that are silent
regarding classwide arbitration. The "second generation" of arbitration clauses address classwide
arbitration specifically, and preclude classwide arbitration expressly. What I describe as "third
generation" clauses address classwide arbitration in a manner far more sophisticated than earlier
generations of clauses, in order to overcome unconscionability considerations. For the most part,
this article addresses the first generation of arbitration clauses that are silent regarding classwide
arbitration.
9. Steven J. Ware, Symposium: Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Con-
sumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DIsp. RESOL. 89, 90 (2001) [hereinafter Ware I]; LIPSKY &
SEEBER, supra note 3, at 11.
10. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements: Common (and
Uncommon) Terms, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 81, 82 (2002) [hereinafter Drahozal I].
11. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1995); Gov't of U.K. v. Boeing
Co., 998 F.2d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1993); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107,
108 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Protective
Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989); Del E. Webb
Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas
Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977
F. Supp. 654, 665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1424
(M.D. Ala. 1997); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993).
12. Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, inc., 82 A.D.2d 87, 94-95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Med
Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998); cf, Unif. Arbitration Act § 10(c) (2000) ("The
court may not order consolidation of the claims of a party to an agreement to arbitrate if the agree-
ment prohibits consolidation.").
13. New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 3 (1 st Cir. 1988).
14. Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Kal-
man Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc., 481 A.2d 553, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984);
Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 437 A.2d 208, 220 (Md. 1981); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v.
Fed, Ins. Co., 255 S.E.2d 451, 452 (S.C. 1979); Callaway v. Carswell, 242 S.E.2d 103, 106 (Ga.
1978); Boynton v. Carswell, 233 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ga. 1977).
15. Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 175 Cal. App. 3d 935, 945 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Izzi
v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see STEPHEN J. WARE,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 74 (2001) [hereinafter WARE II].
16. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
17. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-54.
18. Id. at 453.
CLASS WIDE ARBITRATION
tration to prohibit the arbitration of class claims.' 9 In turn, Bazzle
spawned the promulgation of classwide arbitration procedural rules by
two of the three major arbitration providers,20 making classwide arbitra-
tion a new, if still largely uncharted, reality.
As classwide arbitration increases,2' reexamination of the appropri-
ate procedures for classwide arbitration, including the hybrid model of
classwide arbitration, is appropriate. Expansion of the preemptive scope
of federal arbitration law under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
22
and the Supreme Court's persistent pro-arbitration agenda 23 have nar-
rowed the opportunities for state experimentation with classwide arbitral
models such as the hybrid model, where ongoing judicial involvement is
mandated. 24
This Article makes three major points. First, I assert that Bazzle
implicitly overruled case law in the majority of federal circuits and in
some state courts that effectively prohibited classwide arbitration in
many federal circuits and state venues. These federal and state decisions
prohibiting classwide arbitration rested primarily upon two rationales.
First, the "contract interpretation rationale" resulted in courts interpreting
contracts that are silent regarding classwide arbitration to preclude
classwide arbitration. Second, the "lack of power rationale" held that
courts lacked the power and authority to send class action litigation to
arbitration.25 I argue that Bazzle (which does not explicitly discuss the
prior federal or state authority prohibiting classwide arbitration) implic-
itly undermines both rationales, and effectively overrules both the state
and federal authority prohibiting classwide arbitration, setting the stage
for a significant expansion of arbitral power.
19. See id. at 451 (indicating that the language of the contract is not clear and that the answer
to the contract interpretation question is "not completely obvious").
20. Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1 .jsp?JSPssid=15753&JSPsrc=uploadLIVESITE\.RulesProcedures\Topi
cs_InterestkAAAClassaction.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) (supplementary rules became effective
on October 8, 2003); Notes from Carole J. Buckner, Author, American Bar Association, Ultimate
Arbitration Update CLE (August 8, 2004) (on file with author) (JAMS/Endispute announced at the
American Bar Association Annual Meeting in August 2004 that it has established its policies and
will publish them shortly. In contrast, the third major arbitration provider, the National Arbitration
Forum, has decided not to publish rules specifically pertaining to class action arbitration.).
21. At the recent ABA Annual Meeting in August, 2004, Atlanta, Eric Tuchmann, General
Counsel for the American Arbitration Association, reported that approximately 48 cases had been
filed with the AAA in the last month. Notes from Carole J. Buckner, Author, American Bar Asso-
ciation, Ultimate Arbitration Update CLE (August 8, 2004) (on file with author). JAMS/Endispute
reported it is now accepting classwide arbitration cases and announced the adoption of rules regard-
ing classwide arbitration procedure. Id.
22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2004).
23. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
24. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (discussing the preservation of states'
rights under our federalist system).
25. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1995); Dominium Austin
Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2001).
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Secondly, given the expansion of the preemptive scope of federal
arbitration law, combined with Bazzle and its progeny, I assert that the
hybrid model of classwide arbitration, in which the court continues adju-
dicating certain aspects of classwide arbitration (including, for example,
class certification, notice and settlement approval), is no longer legally
viable. While a handful of state courts have approved the hybrid model,
which mandates ongoing judicial supervision of the class action-related
aspects of class arbitration,26 and the recently promulgated AAA Rules
contemplate the ongoing availability of this model,27 I assert that the
hybrid model of classwide arbitration conflicts with federal arbitration
law, including Bazzle, and that courts should determine that federal arbi-
tration law preempts the hybrid model of classwide arbitration. Addi-
tionally, I assert that the hybrid model of classwide arbitration is implic-
itly disapproved by the Bazzle plurality opinion.
I conclude from these premises that a pure arbitral model of class-
wide arbitration is mandated by the preemptive scope of federal arbitra-
tion law. Further, I conclude that Bazzle and its progeny endorse a pure
arbitral model of classwide arbitration in which the arbitrator first deter-
mines whether the arbitration clause permits classwide arbitration, and
then determines all class action-related issues. Issues of class certifica-
tion, notice, discovery and approval of settlement, reserved under the
hybrid model for the courts, are now appropriately determined purely
within the arbitral proceeding. Judicial involvement in the arbitral proc-
ess is appropriate only as expressly permitted by the FAA.
To place this analysis in context, Part H of this Article generally
discusses the history of judicial hostility toward arbitration and the na-
tional policy favoring arbitration. This Part provides an important under-
standing of the context in which both federal and state authority prohib-
ited courts from sending class action cases to arbitration and informs the
underlying rationale for the hybrid system of classwide arbitration. Part
26. Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. C1. 1991); Lewis
v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Izzi v. Mesquite Country
Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc.,
481 A.2d 553, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 437
A.2d 208, 220 (Md. 1981); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 255 S.E.2d 451,452 (S.C. 1979);
Callaway v. Carswell, 242 S.E.2d 103, 106-07 (Ga. 1978); Boynton v. Carswell, 233 S.E.2d 185,
186-87 (Ga. 1977); See WARE II, supra note 15.
27. The AAA Rules provide that "[w]henever a court has, by order, addressed and resolved
any matter that would otherwise be decided by an arbitrator under these Supplementary Rules, the
arbitrator shall follow the order of the court." Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, Rule 1 (c), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15753&JSPsrc=upload
\LIVESITE\RulesProcedures\TopicsInterestkAAAClassaction.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
The AAA Rules also permit judicial review of the arbitrator's decisions regarding the interpretation
of whether the arbitration clause permits classwide arbitration and regarding the certification of the
class. Id. at Rule 3, 5(d). A representative of the AAA reported to the author that the AAA prefers
the hybrid model. See Notes from Carole J. Buckner, Author, American Bar Association, Ultimate
Arbitration Update CLE (August 8, 2004) (on file with author). In contrast, the rules announced by
JAMS will not contemplate ongoing court involvement in classwide arbitration. See id.
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II also describes the United States Supreme Court's reversal of this his-
toric hostility by declaring a national policy favoring arbitration, and
issuing a series of pro-arbitration decisions. The Bazzle decision, with its
pro-arbitration bent, followed a well-established pattern in which the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the anti-arbitration decisions of lower
courts and substituted pro-arbitration case law. Bazzle indicates that the
FAA's purpose of eliminating animosity toward arbitration is still very
much a mission in progress rather than a goal accomplished.
Part III describes pre-Bazzle federal law regarding classwide arbi-
tration, beginning with the rather minimal jurisprudence of the U.S. Su-
preme Court addressing classwide arbitration. Part III then discusses in
detail federal and state court authority generally prohibiting classwide
arbitration, exploring the extent to which pre-Bazzle law continued to
reflect hostility to classwide arbitration, despite the national policy favor-
ing arbitration. This Part also discusses the decision in Southland Corp.
v. Keating,28 the case that both expanded the scope of FAA preemption
and, at the California Supreme Court level, established the hybrid model
of classwide arbitration. This Part further explores strategies utilized by
corporate drafters to leverage the federal authority to eliminate corporate
exposure to class actions entirely in many forums, and the resulting un-
conscionability backlash pursuant to which some state courts are finding
such strategies ineffective. I propose that the Bazzle opinion may implic-
itly signal the U.S. Supreme Court's disapproval of the corporate strategy
of avoiding class actions by using arbitration clauses.
Part IV discusses in detail the state experimentation with classwide
arbitration under the "hybrid" approach, beginning with the California
Supreme Court's decision in Keating v. Superior Court,29 which gave
birth to the "hybrid" system of classwide arbitration.30 This Part then
describes the evolution of the hybrid model through the development of
the law in California and several other jurisdictions, both state and fed-
eral, that adopted the hybrid model, as well as the scope of judicial in-
volvement in classwide arbitrations established by these decisions.
Part V discusses the Bazzle decision, including the North Carolina
Supreme Court's opinion endorsing classwide arbitration, the U.S. Su-
preme Court plurality opinion, and subsequent cases interpreting Bazzle.
In Bazzle, five Justices permitted the arbitrator to decide whether class
arbitration should proceed, and, importantly, indicated that when an arbi-
tration clause is silent regarding classwide arbitration, it is not clear that
such silence must be interpreted to prohibit classwide arbitration.3 This
Part also discusses the handful of cases following Bazzle that are part of
28. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
29. 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982).
30. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1984).
31. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454.
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the slowly evolving trend toward a pure arbitral model of classwide arbi-
tration. Finally, this Part describes and critiques the procedural rules for
classwide arbitration announced by arbitration providers.
Part VI discusses the scope of federal preemption of state law re-
garding arbitration and describes the extent to which courts have deter-
mined that state-created laws contradicting federal arbitration law are
preempted. This Part explores the United States Supreme Court's juris-
prudence regarding federal preemption of state law in the area of arbitra-
tion, and describes Professor Christopher Drahozal's analytical model for
determining whether a particular state law is preempted by federal arbi-
tration law.
Part VII describes the pure arbitral paradigm of classwide arbitra-
tion. First, this Part explains why the Bazzle decision implicitly over-
rules the line of authority prohibiting classwide arbitration by undermin-
ing both the lack of power rationale and the contract interpretation ra-
tionale. Secondly, this Part demonstrates why a pure arbitral model of
classwide arbitration is viable under federal preemption law and why that
model is implicitly endorsed by the Bazzle decision. In this Part, I argue
that, after Bazzle, arbitrators can determine that a silent arbitration clause
permits classwide arbitration and I conclude that under the applicable
law regarding judicial review of arbitral decisions, it is not likely that
courts will vacate such rulings. Finally, this Part concludes that federal
arbitration law preempts the hybrid model of classwide arbitration and
indicates how the Bazzle decision implicitly rejects the hybrid model in
favor of a pure arbitral model. Consideration of all of these develop-
ments leads to the conclusion that only a pure arbitral model of classwide
arbitration remains legally viable.
II. THE SCHIZOPHRENIC CONTEXT: HISTORICAL ANIMOSITY YIELDS TO A
NATIONAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION
A. Judicial Antipathy Toward Arbitration
The common law regarded arbitration agreements with "hostility.
32
At common law, parties could revoke or repudiate an arbitration agree-
ment at any time before an award was rendered under either a doctrine of
"revocability' 33 or "voidability. ''34 Alternatively, courts "flatly denied
any remedy for the failure to honor an arbitration agreement." 35 Nine-
teenth century judges disfavored private arbitration 36 because it was said
32. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 32 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
33. Southland, 465 U.S. at 32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
34. See STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 10 (2002).
35. Southland, 465 U.S. at 32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
36. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 131 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 82:2
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to "oust the jurisdiction of the courts. 37 Echoing a rationale repeatedly
expressed in anti-arbitration jurisprudence, 38 and implied by the hybrid
model of classwide arbitration,39 early arbitration statutes provided 40 and
early court decisions held that arbitrators were 'not ordinarily well
enough acquainted with the principles of law or equity' to administer
justice effectively.,
41
Although the FAA was enacted to reverse the historical animosity
42against arbitration, judicial hostility continued as courts placed certain
subject matters beyond the reach of arbitration by declaring them "inap-
propriate" for arbitral adjudication. A pattern emerged. First, either
the Supreme Court, or lower courts, declared certain substantive legal
matters inappropriate for arbitration.44 The Supreme Court questioned
the competence of arbitrators to resolve complex claims, holding, for
example, that "the protective provisions of the Securities Act require the
exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness, '"" and
precluding the arbitration of antitrust claims.46  But over time, the Su-
preme Court rejected these limitations, 7 overruling the majority of cir-
37. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942)
(internal citations omitted).
38. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (expressing concern that arbitration permits
decisions by arbitrators lacking judicial instruction on the law). At various times, courts have de-
clared a variety of substantive areas of law off limits to arbitration, including antitrust, usury, patent,
securities law, ERISA and others, only later to permit such matters to be arbitrated. IAN R.
MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, REFORMATION-NATIONALIZATION-
INTERNATIONALIZATION 64 (1992).
39. Classwide arbitration will either require continual judicial intrusion or make lay arbitra-
tors inappropriate. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1215 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
40. See MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 21. MacNeil indicates that reformers wanted the elimina-
tion of the rule of revocability, while courts tried to preserve that rule. Id. at 28, 31.
41. BENNETT, supra note 34, at 10 (citing Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321
(C.C.D. Mass. 1845)). MacNeil points out that early anti-arbitration statutes including the English
Arbitration Act of 1889, early drafts of the Uniform Arbitration Act by the Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, approved by the ABA in 1924, and early Illinois law allowed sub-
mission of questions of law for determination by the courts rather than by arbitrators. See MACNEIL,
supra note 38, at 32-33, 37, 48-49, 54. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, DISPUTE-WISE
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT IMPROVING ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES IN MANAGING
BUSINESS CONFLICTS 6 (2003) ("Both arbitrators and mediators are perceived to be better qualified
today than they were in the 1998 study [by Lipsky & Seeber].").
42. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Circuit City Stores v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001); WARE H1, supra note 15, at 22.
43. BENNETT, supra note 34, at 21; MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 64.
44. BENNETT, supra note 34, at 11 (discussing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437-38, overruled by Rod-
riguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (overruling Wilko
and enforcing pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate as to securities claims)).
45. BENNETT, supra note 34, at 11 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437).
46. Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968), over-
ruled by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) (enforcing
agreement to arbitrate as to antitrust claims).
47. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 632 (rejecting four rationales for limiting the reach
of arbitration, including the assertions that "antitrust issues.., require sophisticated legal and eco-
nomic analysis, and thus are 'ill-adapted to strengths of the arbitral process ... [and that] decisions
as to antitrust regulation of business are too important to be lodged in arbitrators chosen from the
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cuits following its earlier decisions48 and rejecting the concept that anti-
trust, securities and RICO claims were "too complex" for arbitrators.49
B. The National Policy Favoring Arbitration
Congress enacted the FAA50 with the express purpose of reversing
"the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts."'', Congress intended the FAA to overcome early attitudes52 and
to establish a strong national policy in favor of arbitration.53 The FAA's
provisions manifest a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments. 54 The FAA provides an expeditious technique of dispute resolu-
tion intended to reduce the burden on precious judicial resources, 55 as
well as to address the costliness and delays of litigation.56
The presumption in favor of arbitration is "a powerful one."5 7 The
courts are directed by precedent to move cases out of the court system
and into arbitration "as quickly and easily as possible."58 At the same
time, the legislative history reflects a clear intent to assure the institu-
tional competency of the arbitration system.59 Congress intended to cre-
ate a system of arbitration in which the parties "need not resort to the
courts at all."60
Questions of arbitrability should be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration.61 In its decisions, the Supreme
Court repeatedly rejected attacks on arbitration that are premised upon
"suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections af-
forded in the substantive law to would-be complainants. 62
business community..."') (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 723 F.2d
155, 162 (lst Cir. 1983)).
48. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (overruling the majority of
circuits holding that claims under the Securities Exchange Act were not arbitrable).
49. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485 (holding Securities Act claims are arbitrable);
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242 (holding Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims are arbitrable);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 640 (enforcing agreement to arbitrate as to antitrust claims).
50. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2004).
51. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see also Circuit City
Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001); WARE II, supra note 15, at 22.
52. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
53. Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 727 (8th Cir. 2001).
54. Moses H. Cone Mem 'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (1983).
55. Barrentine v. Ark. Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 753 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing).
56. Herrmann, supra note 3, at 787.
57. Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000).
58. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 22.
59. See Herrmann, supra note 3, at 787 (the procedure set forth in the FAA "safeguard[ed] the
rights of the parties").
60. Id. at 788.
61. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
62. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90 (2000) (quoting Rodriguez de
Quias, 490 U.S. at 481).
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In fact, arbitration strikes a balance between the two competing
policies of efficiency and competency.63 On one hand, arbitration is de-
fined and uniquely characterized by its efficiency, 64 including cost reduc-
tion resulting from a more limited scope of review and the reduction of
discovery. 65 On the other hand, the competing interest in "competency,"
the quality of justice, weighs against taking the efficiency measures of
arbitration to an extreme.
][I. PRE-BAZZLE FEDERAL LAW REGARDING CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION
A. Southland Corp. v. Keating
One case, Southland Corp. v. Keating,67 established both the pre-
emptive scope of the FAA,68 and, because the U. S. Supreme Court did
not address the issue, also coincidentally launched the most experimental
state program regarding the combination of class actions and arbitration,
the so-called "hybrid" system of classwide arbitration.69 This Part dis-
cusses the preemption holdings and the class action aspects of the U. S.
Supreme Court's Southland decision and the due process issues raised.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Keating v. Superior Court7
is discussed in further detail in Part IV below concerning the "hybrid"
system of classwide arbitration.
In Southland, approximately eight hundred 7-Eleven franchisees
filed a state court class action against the owner and franchisor of 7-
Eleven convenience stores.71 The parties' agreement provided that "any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the
breach hereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules
of the American Arbitration Association. 72 The franchisor moved to
compel arbitration, and the franchisees requested that the court certify a
class. 73 The trial court compelled arbitration of all claims except those
arising from California franchise law and did not rule on the class certifi-
74cation motion. Regarding the issue of conducting the arbitration on a
classwide basis, the California Court of Appeals determined that "there
was no 'insurmountable obstacle"' to doing so and directed "the trial
63. See Herrmann, supra note 3, at 782.
64. Id.
65. Ware I, supra note 9, at 90.
66. See id.
67. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
68. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
69. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 613 (1982) (permitting classwide arbitration
while acknowledging that classwide arbitration procedure would "entail a greater degree of judicial
involvement than is normally associated with arbitration"), rev'd on other grounds in Southland, 465
U.S. at 16.
70. 31 Cal. 3d 584 (1982).
71. Southland, 465 U.S. at 3-4.
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court to conduct a class certification proceeding., 75 The California Su-
preme Court determined that the claims under California franchise law
were not arbitrable.76 The U.S. Supreme Court in Southland determined
that federal arbitration law preempted the California franchise law and
held the claims should be arbitrated.77
While the FAA does not fully preempt state law regarding arbitra-
tion, under the preemption doctrine first announced in Southland, the
FAA preempts state laws that undermine arbitration by "requiring a judi-
cial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration. 78 In Southland, the Court considered
whether a statute requiring "judicial consideration" of the franchisee's
claims in direct conflict with Section 2 of the FAA violated the Suprem-
acy Clause of the Constitution. 79 The Court held that Congress, by en-
acting Section 2 of the FAA, "withdrew the power of the states to require
a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration. 80
The Court explained that the FAA permitted "only two limitations
on the enforceability" of arbitration agreements: (1) the contract is not
part of a transaction involving commerce or a maritime transaction; or
(2) the limitation arises from "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 8' Nothing in the FAA permits "any addi-
tional limitations under State law.",82 Examining legislative history, the
Court declared that the purpose of Congress in enacting the FAA was to
foreclose state attempts to "undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements ' 83 and held that the FAA "preempts a state law that with-
draws the power to enforce arbitration agreements."
84
The Southland Court then scrutinized the California statute to de-
termine whether it fit within the savings clause of Section 2 of the FAA
and determined that the California law was "not a ground that exist[ed] at
law or in equity 'for the revocation of any contract,' but merely a ground
that exist[ed] for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts
subject to the California [law].' '85 Noting the potential for state laws to
"wholly eviscerate congressional intent to place arbitration agreements
'upon the same footing as other contracts,"' the Court indicated that the
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 17.
78. Id. at 10.
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1o-11.
82. Id. at 11.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id. at 16 n.10.
85. Id. at 16 n.l 1.
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California law conflicted with the FAA and therefore violated the Su-
premacy Clause.
86
Describing the issue as "the propriety of superimposing class action
procedures on a contract arbitration," 7 the U.S. Supreme Court left intact
the California Supreme Court's ruling remanding the case to the trial
court for determination of whether classwide arbitration was appropriate
because the franchisor did not assert the claim that if state law required
class action procedures, state law would conflict with the FAA in viola-
tion of the Supremacy Clause.88
The franchisor did argue that state law did not permit arbitrations to
proceed as class actions. 89 As discussed below, the California Supreme
Court had rejected this argument, holding that because state arbitration
law authorized consolidation, it was not likely that the California Legis-
lature "intended to preclude a court from ordering classwide arbitration
in an appropriate case."90 Because the franchisor had not opposed class
procedures on 'federal grounds," and the California Supreme Court in
Keating had not "passed upon the question whether superimposing class
action procedures on a contract arbitration was contrary to the [FAA],"
the U.S. Supreme Court in Southland held that it lacked "jurisdiction to
resolve the question as a matter of federal law."
91
The Southland Court also left the issue of due process in classwide
arbitration unaddressed. The defendant had argued that "requiring arbi-
trations to proceed as class actions 'could well violate the [federal] con-
stitutional guaranty of procedural due process.', 92 In its determination
that the California Supreme Court did not pass on the preemption issue,
so that the U.S. Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to address the class
action arbitration issue, the Southland Court seems to have overlooked
the fact that the due process argument could have provided it with such
jurisdiction, since it did not expressly address the issue beyond acknowl-
edging that Southland raised the argument below.
After Southland, the U.S. Supreme Court said little about classwide
arbitration, until Bazzle. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
93
the plaintiff sought to defeat an agreement to arbitrate claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act by arguing the inferiority of
arbitration to litigation, since arbitration procedures did not permit class
actions. 94 In response, the Court acknowledged that "NYSE rules also
86. Id. at 16.
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Keating, 31 Cal. 3d at 613 (emphasis added).
91. Southland, 465 U.S. at 9.
92. Id. at 8.
93. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
94. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
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provide for collective proceedings," implicitly approving classwide arbi-
tration.95
B. Federal Authority Prohibiting Classwide Arbitration
Against this backdrop of uncertain guidance from the U.S. Supreme
Court, despite the national policy favoring arbitration and perhaps re-
flecting continued judicial ambivalence toward arbitration, particularly
classwide arbitration, an extensive body of federal law developed prohib-
iting the adjudication of class action disputes in arbitration. This Section
discusses that federal law and its dual rationales for prohibiting class
actions in arbitration.
Prior to Bazzle, most federal courts concluded that absent a provi-
sion in the parties' arbitration agreement expressly allowing the parties'
arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis (in other words, where the
parties' agreement was silent regarding classwide arbitration), the arbi-
tration could not proceed on a classwide or consolidated basis.96 This
line of authority reveals two rationales for this prohibition. The first
rationale, which I describe as the "lack of power" rationale, holds that the
court lacks the authority to certify an individual plaintiff as a class repre-
sentative for other parties whose claims are subject to arbitration,97 lacks
express authority to consolidate arbitration proceedings,98 and lacks au-
thority to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in class arbitration."
The second rationale, which I describe as the "contract interpretation"
rationale, posits that as a matter of contract interpretation, courts cannot
"read into" an otherwise silent agreement a provision expressly allowing
classwide arbitration.1°°
One of the key decisions describing these two rationales as the basis
for prohibiting classwide arbitration is Champ v. Siegel Trading Co.,
95. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
96. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1995); Randolph v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1423-1424 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick
Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828
F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993); Gov't of U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993);
Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991); Protective Life Ins.
Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (1lth Cir. 1989); Del E. Webb Constr. v.
Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987); Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d
1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Weyerhauser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th
Cir. 1984).
97. Champ, 55 F.3d at 271.
98. Id. at 274-77; Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720,728-729 (8th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court did not err in compelling arbitration of the dispute as indi-
viduals rather than as a class, because "district court was without power to consolidate arbitration
proceedings when arbitration agreements were silent on the issue").
99. Champ, 55 F.3d at 276-77 (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not
applicable in proceedings before arbitrators which are regulated by the rules of the arbitration asso-
ciation).
100. Id. at 277.
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Inc. 10 1 In Champ, the plaintiff sought class certification from the court
after the court ordered that the matter be arbitrated.10 2 Reversing its own
prior ruling, 10 3 the trial court held that it lacked the authority to certify a
class arbitration where the parties had not agreed to such a procedure in
their arbitration agreement.'0 4 Although the claimant initially seeking
class certification settled her matter, two other claimants received per-
mission to intervene and appealed the court's determination. 0 5 The in-
tervenors claimed that the court had authority under FRCP Rule 23, as
incorporated through Rule 81(a)(3), 1°6 to order classwide arbitration,' °7
and that FAA Section 4 did not preclude classwide arbitration because
the contract did not expressly preclude it.'08
In the absence of authority directly on point, Champ relied heavily
upon cases holding that district courts lacked the power to consolidate
arbitration °9 and determined that Section 4 of the FAA precluded the
court from reading into the parties' agreement a term allowing classwide
arbitration, which might disrupt the negotiated risk/benefit allocation and
direct the parties to proceed with an arbitration different in nature from
that agreed upon."
°  The Second,' Fifth,"' Sixth,"' Seventh,'
1 4
Eighth,"5 Ninth'1 6 and Eleventh Circuits" 7 held that courts lacked the
power to order consolidated arbitration. Treatises, commentators, and
cases reasoned that, if the courts lacked power to order consolidation,
101. 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
102. Champ, 55 F.3d at 271.
103. The court initially adopted the hybrid approach permitting the combination of the class
action and arbitration, with court supervision, and directed that the court determine the issue of class
certification. See Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman III, Symposium: Achieving Justice
in Arbitration, Selected Topics in Securities Arbitration: Rule 15C2-2, Fraud, Duress, Unconscion-
ability, Waiver, Class Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorneys' Fees and
Costs, 65 TuL. L. REv. 1547, 1588 (1991).
104. Champ, 55 F.3d at 271.
105. Id. at 274.
106. See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3) (providing that in arbitration proceedings under the FAA, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the extent that matters of procedure are not otherwise
provided for under the FAA).
107. Champ, 55 F.3d at 274.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 274-75.
110. Id. at 275.
111. Gov't of the U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993).
112. Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987).
113. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991).
114. Champ, 55 F.3d at 275 (finding no basis to distinguish between classwide arbitration and
consolidation); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 210 F.3d 771, 774
(7th Cir. 2000) (Judge Posner acknowledges the general rule that courts cannot consolidate arbitra-
tion in defiance of parties' contractual agreement, but finds the agreement in questions permits
consolidation).
115. Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674-75 (D. Minn. 1993),
overruled on other grounds in Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 88 (2000);
Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990).
116. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas Shipping Co., 743 F. 2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984).
117. Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l. Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281,282 (1 th Cir.
1989).
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then by analogy they also lacked authority to order classwide arbitra-
tion."'
The Champ court also determined that it could not fill the proce-
dural gap regarding classwide arbitration procedure with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 because no procedural gap existed." 9 Because the
FAA required enforcement of the parties' arbitration agreement accord-
ing to its terms, and the agreement was silent regarding class arbitration,
the Champ court reasoned that the parties themselves had provided for
non-class action arbitration. 120 The Champ court further explained that
Rule 81 allowed procedural gap-filling only in judicial proceedings per-
taining to arbitration 121 and, importantly, acknowledged that Rule 81 did
not authorize application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to pro-
ceedings on the merits before arbitrators, who are regulated by the rules
of the arbitration provider. 122 The Champ court concluded that parties
relinquished their rights to pursue a class action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 when they agreed to arbitration.
123
Other pre-Bazzle decisions following Champ similarly held that the
district court's lack of power to consolidate arbitration proceedings pre-
cluded the court from ordering classwide arbitration, often without refer-
ence to the contract interpretation rationale. 124  The rationale of some
federal decisions prohibiting classwide arbitration, such as Gammaro v.
Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 125 rested expressly on the court's lack of
power. 1
26
In Champ, the intervenors also argued that the proper interpretation
of the contract supported their request that the court should order class
arbitration because an order compelling class arbitration did not contra-
dict the terms of the parties' agreement, which was silent regarding
classwide arbitration. 127  But the Champ court rejected this argument,
holding that the court may not read into an arbitration agreement that is
118. ALAN S. KAPLINSKY, ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTIONS: A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS,
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK 244 (2003)
(citing FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, § 18.9.1, at 18:91).
119. It is interesting to note that one of the major private arbitration providers has chosen to
"fill the procedural gap" by implementing a rule similar in many respects to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. See AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936.
120. Champ, 55 F.3d at 276.
121. Id. (noting that such judicial proceedings include petitions for orders compelling arbitra-
tion, confirmation of arbitration awards, motions for vacatur of awards and applications for modify-
ing or correcting arbitration awards).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 276-77.
124. See e.g., Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728-29 (8th Cir.
2001).
125. 828 F. Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1993), overruled on other grounds in Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 88 (2000).
126. Gammaro, 828 F. Supp. at 674-75.
127. Champ, 55 F.3d at 274.
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silent regarding classwide arbitration a provision permitting such a pro-
cedure. 28  The Champ court refused "to substitute our own notion of
fairness in place of the explicit terms of [the parties'] agreement."'' 29 The
Champ court referenced its obligation under the FAA to "enforce the
parties' agreement as they wrote it," even when doing so might create
inefficiency.
130
Judge Rovner concurred with the result in Champ based upon the
premise that the courts lacked authority to order classwide arbitration,
but made some interesting assertions regarding the contract interpretation
issue that are consistent with the Bazzle court's interpretation of arbitra-
tion agreements that are silent regarding class action arbitration. Judge
Rovner stated:
I attach less significance than the majority to the fact that the parties
have not spoken to this subject in the arbitration agreement they
signed. Class certification is a matter that parties rarely, if ever,
speak to in their contracts, even when they have made other provi-
sions for the resolution of potential disputes. And, practically speak-
ing, I doubt that class certification is something that corporate defen-
dants who draft these agreements for their clients to sign would ever
consent to in writing; they typically have far more to gain by forcing
unhappy customers to bear the expense of arbitrating individually.
[Citations omitted.] Thus, I do not view silence in the arbitration
agreement as a bar to class certification. 132
Even prior to Bazzle, one commentator agreed with Judge Rovner's
observations, and found it striking that courts so readily construed si-
lence to preclude class arbitration rather than to permit it.
13 3
Several state courts followed these precedents, refusing to order the
consolidation of arbitration proceedings134 or to allow classwide arbitra-
128. Id. at 277.
129. Id. at 275 (citing Universal Reinsurance Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 16 F.3d 125, 130 (7th
Cir. 1994).
130. Id. at 277 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 277-78 (Rovner, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 84, 86-87 (2000) (noting that such an approach
would involve "considerably less intrusion upon the contractual aspects of the relationship) [herein-
after Stemlight 1].
134. See e.g., Consol. Pac. Eng'g., Inc. v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough, 563 P.2d 252, 255
(Alaska 1977) (holding that court lacks power to order consolidation of arbitration proceedings
where arbitration agreement is silent regarding consolidation); Bateman Constr., Inc. v. Haitsuka
Bros., Ltd., 889 P.2d 58, 64 (Haw. 1995) (holding that court cannot consolidate arbitrations where
the arbitration agreement is silent regarding consolidation of arbitration); Pueblo of Laguna v. Cil-
lessen & Son, Inc.. 682 P.2d 197, 199-200 (N.M. 1984); In re Cullman Ventures, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d
391, 395 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that court cannot consolidate arbitrations); Bay County
Bldg. Auth. v. Spence Bros., 362 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (noting trial court erred in
ordering consolidation of arbitrations where arbitration agreement was silent regarding
consolidation); S.K. Barnes, Inc. v. Valiquette, 597 P.2d 941, 943-44 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (deny-
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tion, based on similar analyses.' 35 A notable exception is the First Cir-
cuit, which permits courts to consolidate arbitrations. In New England
Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 136 the First Circuit rejected the
contract interpretation rationale relied upon by Champ and cases follow-
ing Champ.137  The Keystone court stated "We disagree that ordering
consolidation ... improperly modifies the agreement [especially] when
the language of the arbitration clause is broad, and in no way suggests
limits on the subjects or parties to the agreed-upon arbitration," and con-
cluded "arbitration is still arbitration even if it is consolidated arbitra-
tion."' 138  The Keystone court held that where arbitration contracts are
silent regarding consolidation, "[u]nquestionably, there is no intent mani-
fested against consolidation,"'139 and concluded that the lower court had
not abused its discretion by consolidating the matters.1t4 As discussed
below, after examining the language of an arbitration agreement similar
to that construed by these federal and state authorities, 41 and without
discussion of these precedents, the Bazzle plurality concluded that the
contract interpretation issue was not so obvious. 142
ing consolidation of arbitration proceedings based upon both the lack of court power and the silence
of the arbitration clause regarding consolidation); I DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION § 32:3
(2003).
135. See e.g., Med. Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998) (denying class wide
arbitration based upon the contract interpretation rationale, citing Champ); Harris v. Shearson Hay-
den Stone, Inc., 82 A.D.2d 87, 94-95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (ordering individual arbitration and
rejecting class arbitration based upon a silent arbitration clause premised upon the rationale that
interests in enforcing arbitration prevail over those favoring class actions, and also based upon
contract interpretation rationale).
136. 855 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1988).
137. New England Energy v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 5.
138. New England Energy, 855 F.2d at 5.
139. Id. at 7.
140. Id. at 8.
141. The arbitration provision in Champ is not quoted in the Seventh Circuit's decision, but is
referenced in an earlier superseded decision as broad as the agreement in Bazzle. Champ v. Siegel
Trading Co., Inc. 132 F.R.D. 51, n. I (N.D. Ill. 1990), vacated on reconsideration in Perera v. Siegel
Trading Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1992). The provision in Gammaro is arguably as broad as
the agreement in Bazzle. The Gammaro arbitration clause provided that:
You and ITT Financial Services agree that, other than judicial foreclosures and cancella-
tions regarding real estate security, any dispute, past, present, or future, between us or
claim by either against the other or any agent or affiliate of the other, whether related to
your loan, products you purchase from or through 1 fr Financial Services, or otherwise
shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the arbitration rules of the Na-
tional Arbitration Forum, Minneapolis, Minnesota ....
Gammaro, 15 F.3d at 94.
The arbitration provision in Johnson was equally broad, providing:
You and we agree that any claim, dispute, or controversy between us ... and any claim
arising from or relating to this Note, no matter by whom or against whom... including
the validity of this Note and of this agreement to arbitrate disputes as well as claims al-
leging fraud or misrepresentation shall be resolved by binding arbitration by and under
the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.
Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000).
142. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Bazzle indicated that the
court should construe the arbitration provision that is silent regarding class wide arbitration against
the drafter. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 (2002), vacated and remanded by
Bazzle, 539 U.S 444 (2003).
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C. Corporate Drafters Leveraged the Authority Prohibiting Classwide
Arbitration, Provoking an Unconscionability Backlash
Businesses seeking to prevent class actions relied upon the Champ
line of authority prohibiting class actions in arbitration and implemented
a strategy of utilizing arbitration clauses to eliminate corporate exposure
to class action litigation. 143 Where plaintiffs alleged a class action, and
the corporate defendant sought to compel arbitration pursuant to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement containing an arbitration clause silent re-
garding classwide arbitration, despite the general policies favoring both
class actions and arbitration, courts frequently ordered plaintiffs to arbi-
trate their claims individually and dismissed the class action claims. 144 In
doing so, these courts often rejected the argument that the arbitration
clause was invalid because it effectively precluded class arbitration and
ordered the non-class arbitration of the claims. 145 Because the arbitration
piece of the agreement remained enforceable, these courts relied upon
the strong policy favoring arbitration according to the agreement of the
parties. 14  Plaintiffs found the prospect of pursuing small dollar amount
claims in arbitration uneconomical. 147 Accordingly, corporate defendants
relying upon arbitration clauses that were silent regarding classwide arbi-
tration could often escape liability entirely. One rationale expressed for
enforcing individual arbitration of claims was that a consumer could oth-
erwise circumvent an agreement to arbitrate by bringing her claim on
behalf of the general public. 148 Such an exception would plainly under-
mine Congress's policy to promote the enforceability of such agree-
ments. 14 9 Thus, the ability to avoid class actions became a prime motiva-
tion for some businesses to utilize arbitration.
50
A second generation of arbitration clauses, referred to as "class ac-
tion waivers" or "no-class action clauses," avoided the risk of a finding
143. KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 220; Hans Smit, Arbitral & Judicial Decision: Class
Actions in Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 175, 175-76 (2003); BENNETT, supra note 34, at
162-63.
144. KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 220; Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp.
77, 80 (D. Conn. 1996); Coleman v. Nat'l Movie-Dine, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 945, 947-48 (E. D. Pa.
1978).
145. KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 220.
146. Id. at 221-22 (discussing Champ, 55 F.3d 269 and Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione
S.p.A. v. M/V Allegra, 198 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. 1999).
147. See, e.g., Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16
FRANCHISE L.J. 141 (Spring 1997).
148. KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 220.
149. Meyers v. Univest Home Loan, Inc., 1993 WL 307747 *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1993).
150. Carroll E. Neesemann, Should an Arbitration Provision Trump the Class Action? Yes:
Permitting Courts to Strike Bar on Class Actions in Otherwise Clean Clause Would Discourage Use
of Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG. 13, 15 (Spring 2002); Jean R. Stemlight, Should an Arbitration
Provision Trump the Class Action? No: Permitting Companies to Skirt Class Actions Through
Mandatory Arbitration Would be Dangerous and Unwise, DiSP. RESOL. MAG. 13, 18 (Spring 2002)
[hereinafter Stemlight i]; Ware I, supra note 9, at 94; Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th
1094, 1101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (describing the strategy of using prohibitions on class actions com-
bined with arbitration clauses as creating "virtual immunity" from small claims regardless of merit).
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that silent arbitration clauses might be construed as ambiguous regarding
classwide arbitration by expressly excluding class actions from arbitra-
tion.'15  Bazzle did not address such clauses, but many lower courts en-
force them. Furthermore, some commentators predict that arbitration
clauses including express prohibitions of classwide arbitration will re-
main enforceable, particularly where such clauses are not combined with
additional factors rendering the arbitration clause vulnerable to an un-
conscionability determination.152 Other commentators suggest that draft-
ing an enforceable class action waiver is the best remedy for businesses
to counteract the effect of Bazzle. 5 3
But the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the enforceability of class
action waivers or no-class action clauses. 54 In addition, the practice of
including such clauses in arbitration agreements increases the risk that
the class action waiver will not be enforced given recent decisions find-
ing such provisions unconscionable, 155 or void as against public policy,
56
particularly in the context of consumer arbitration.
57
Most federal courts, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit, 158 re-
ject the proposition that clauses expressly precluding class arbitration are
unconscionable on the grounds that the courts are "obliged to enforce the
type of arbitration to which [the] parties agreed."1 59  Some state courts
151. These clauses are often referred to as "no-class action" clauses or "class action waivers."
152. Neesemann, supra note 150, at 15.
153. Smit, supra note 143, at 176; Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Arbitration Update:
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle-Dazzle for Green Tree, Fizzle for Practitioners, 59 Bus.
LAW. 1265, 1272 (May, 2004).
154. Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 153, at 1272 (arguing that at least three Justices believe
that the FAA would preempt a determination that a class action waiver is unconscionable and that
four Justices would enforce a class action waiver).
155. Kevin M. Kennedy & Bethany Appleby, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle: A New
Day for Class Arbitrations?, 23 FRANCHISE L.J. 84, 86 (2003); See, e.g., Lytle v. Citifinancial
Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 665-66 (Pa. 2002) (rejecting the argument that the severable no-class
action provisions in the parties' arbitration agreement were unconscionable and violated public
policy, due to lack of evidence indicating plaintiffs would be precluded from effectively vindicating
their claims without a class arbitration, but allowing trial court to consider evidence on remand
regarding the costs of arbitration).
156. IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITrRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, § 18.9.2 (Supp. 1994) ("There is much to
commend" courts holding that arbitration agreements prohibiting class actions are void as against
public policy, because "such provisions certainly thwart the broad pro-arbitration policies of the
FAA."). "4
157. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Gold Rush of 2002: California Courts Lure
Plaintiffs' Lawyers (but Undermine Federal Arbitration Act) by Refusing to Enforce "No-Class
Action '" Clauses in Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 58 BUS. LAW. 1289 (May 2003).
158. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (refusing to enforce an express no-
class action clause in an arbitration agreement on the grounds that doing so would leave consumers
without any effective method of vindicating certain categories of claims).
159. Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc. 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003); Snowden v. Check-
Point Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2002). See also Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note
153, at 1270 (noting all federal courts except the Ninth Circuit enforce clauses expressly waiving
class actions).
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take the position that an express class action waiver is enforceable. 160
Other state courts have voided or refused to enforce arbitration clauses
denying arbitrators the right to hear a class action claim, finding the pro-
vision unconscionable, 161 often because the inability to pursue class ac-
tions in arbitration effectively eliminates the ability of consumers to en-
force their rights.' 62 Recent decisions holding a prohibition on classwide
arbitration unconscionable often arise in the consumer context. Argua-
bly, because of the small dollar amounts in controversy, a class action is
the only practical means of vindicating the consumers' rights, therefore
denying classwide arbitration is unconscionable. 163 Some commentators
have proposed declaring binding arbitration clauses prima facie uncon-
scionable.' 64 Reflecting the uncertainty of the law in this area, JAMS, a
major arbitration provider, announced that it would not enforce class
action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements; shortly thereafter,
JAMS reversed its policy.
165
Although the majority of federal and state authority prior to Bazzle
prohibited classwide arbitration, some states and the First Circuit permit-
ted consolidated or classwide arbitrations. 166  Now that Bazzle has
opened the door for classwide arbitration as discussed in Part VI below,
it is appropriate to reconsider the minority state and federal authority
160. Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Lozano v.
AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076-77 (C.D. Cal. 2002); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy,
105 S.W.3d 190, 200 (Tex. App. 2003); Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 896
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Rosen v. SCIL, LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), Edelist v.
MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1261 (Del, Super. Ct. 2001); Gras v. Assocs. First Capital Corp.,
786 A.2d 886, 894 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.
App. 4th 42, 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding class arbitration is available only in "the absence of an
express agreement not to proceed to arbitration on a classwide basis").
161. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. App. 4th 326, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert.
granted, 65 P.3d 1285 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the FAA preempts state court from applying state
substantive law to strike class action waivers from arbitration agreements); Leonard v. Terminix Int'l
Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 539 (Ala. 2002); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087,
1105 (W.D. Mich. 2000); Mandel v. Household Bank (Nev.) Nat'l Assoc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380,
386 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, 65 P.3d 1284 (Cal. 2003) (holding that term prohibiting
class action in arbitration was unconscionable); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576-77
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (Cal. CL App.
2002); West Virginia ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 280 (W. Va. 2002).
162. BENNETr, supra note 34, at 163; In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 828-29 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
163. Kennedy & Appleby, supra note 155, at 86; See Szetela, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1101; Bell-
South Mobility LLC v. Christopher, 819 So.2d 171, 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that
contract precluding class action relief held substantively unconscionable on its face).
164. Paul D. Carington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 361, 379 (2002);
Marissa Dawn Lawson, Judicial Economy at What Cost? An Argument for Finding Binding Arbitra-
tion Clauses Prima Facie Unconscionable, 23 REv. LmG. 463, 486 (2004).
165. Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Takes Steps to Ensure Fairness in Consumer Arbitrations
(November 12, 2004) (announcing policy not to enforce class action waivers in consumer arbitration
agreements); Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Reaffirms Commitment to Neutrality Through With-
drawal of Class Action Arbitration Waiver Policy (March 10, 2005) (announcing withdrawal of the
policy due to the suggestion that JAMS "had deviated from its core value of neutrality").
166. New England Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988); Calla-
way v. Carswell, 242 S.E.2d 103, 106 (Ga. 1978); Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 613
(Cal. 1982); Boynton v. Carswell, 233 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ga. 1977); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. 1991).
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permitting classwide arbitration, particularly the hybrid model used in
California and several other jurisdictions. Now that classwide arbitration
is a reality, should arbitrators and arbitration providers adopt or accom-
modate the hybrid model of classwide arbitration as the AAA Rules do?
Or, does Bazzle also implicitly negate the hybrid model of classwide
arbitration? Moreover, given the vast scope of preemption of federal
arbitration law, is the hybrid model still legally viable? Or, must it be
abandoned? The next Part describes the history of the hybrid model, and
succeeding Parts consider these questions.
IV. STATE EXPERIMENTATION WITH CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION: THE
"HYBRID" MODEL
This Part discusses one form of state experimentation with class-
wide arbitration, the "hybrid" model, which originated with the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision in Keating v. Superior Court.167 Under the
hybrid system, courts have discretion to decide whether a case is appro-
priate for classwide arbitration, and they retain jurisdiction over the dis-
pute while the merits are arbitrated, allowing courts to remain involved
in the class-related aspects of the case. 168 In Keating, the court explained
that classwide arbitration would entail a greater degree of judicial in-
volvement than normally associated with arbitration, which is ideally "a
complete proceeding, without resort to court facilities. 169 Instead, the
Keating court indicated that in classwide arbitration, the trial court
should make the initial determinations regarding certain class-related
issues such as class certification, notice to the class, and exercise external
supervision over the litigation, in order to safeguard the absent class
members' right to adequate representation.
170
Other courts 17 following Keating v2 indicated that, in the hybrid
model, courts (not arbitrators) should handle issues involving class certi-
fication, proper notice, review of proposed settlements, and conflicts
among class representatives as to the selection of arbitrators. 173 For ex-
ample, Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Securities'" approved class arbitra-
tion in a securities fraud case, but reserved for the court the determina-
tions regarding certification of the class and notice to class members.
75
Echoing the historic concern regarding arbitrator qualifications to handle
167. 31 Cal. 3d 584 (Cal. 1982).
168. Sternlight I, supra note 133, at 39-40.
169. Id. at 40 (citing Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209).
170. Id.
171. Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Lewis
v. Prudential Bache Sec., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
172. Keating, 31 Cal. 3d at 613.
173. Sternlight I, supra note 133, at 40; Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d
860, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
174. 179 Cal. App. 3d 935 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
175. Lewis, 179 Cal. App. at 945-46.
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complex substantive matters, the defendant in Lewis argued that the
"procedural complexities" associated with a class action would under-
mine the benefits that are typically derived from arbitration. 176 Given
that the alternative to class arbitration was to force each Prudential cus-
tomer to arbitrate their claims individually, and the fact that the claims
were modest in amount, the court concluded that the "case appears to
offer no great difficulty in adapting arbitration to fit the class action
mold, with adequate judicial supervision over the class aspects. "177 The
court characterized the possibility of forcing individual Prudential cus-
tomers to arbitrate their claims individually as "so grossly unfair as to
justify structuring arbitration on a class basis in spite of the difficulty it
may present."'178 Without extensive analysis or authority beyond citation
to Keating, Lewis concluded that "[tihere appear to be no factors hinder-
ing class arbitration of this dispute" and appointed the AAA to arbitrate
the matter, reserving for the court's determination the issues of notice
and class certification. 179 Notably, the court stated that Prudential "does
not suggest how the court's supervision over the class aspects will render
the arbitration unmanageable or impractical."'' 80 The court also retained
jurisdiction to supervise the case "as is necessary to safeguard the inter-
ests of the absent class members."' 81
Subsequent California cases, such as Izzi v. Mesquite Country
Club, 82 also followed the hybrid model, carving out in classwide arbitra-
tion a variety of continuing roles for the court and allowing courts to stay
the arbitration in order to determine "class action issues, including certi-
fication of the class, provision of notice and any discovery problems in-
volved therein."' 83  Alternatively, one California court indicated that
courts may, in their discretion, order arbitration and reserve jurisdiction
over class action-related issues, and could "at least in the first instance"
order such issues determined by the arbitrator. 184 In Izzi, the Court ob-
served that "arbitrators are authorized by law" to determine such issues
and speculated that the court could "delegate" the class action issues to
the arbitrator, allowing the arbitrator to rule upon certification and notice
"subject to due process review by the court" in order to "enhance the
integrity and autonomy of classwide arbitration."' 185 The court acknowl-
edged that the "due process review" of the arbitrator's decisions could
result in the disruption of the proceedings. Thus, "judicial determination
of the class action problems would seem preferable" to delegation of the
176. Id.





182. 186 Cal. App. 3d 1309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
183. Izzi, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1322.
184. Id. at 1322 n.6.
185. Id.
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class action aspects of the litigation to the arbitrator, "at least until
greater experience with these problems has been had."
186
More recently, in Sanders v. Kinko's, Inc.,187 an appellate court af-
firmed the order of a trial court staying arbitration in order to permit the
court to address the class action-related issues, including the certification
of the class, prior to sending the case to arbitration.' 88 In Cruz v. Pacifi-
care Health Systems, Inc.,189 the California Supreme Court carved out yet
another role for courts in class actions, anticipating in dicta "that courts
may find it appropriate to become involved in supervising the equitable
distribution of assets resulting from a class recovery." 190  However, the
opinion further stated that courts should "do so without becoming in-
volved in the merits of the underlying dispute."
'19'
California is not alone in its experimentation with the hybrid model
of classwide arbitration. In one of the early decisions permitting class-
wide arbitration, a Pennsylvania court held that classwide arbitration was
not precluded by virtue of an arbitration clause that did not contain an
express provision precluding classwide arbitration.' 92  In Dickler v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 93 the Pennsylvania Superior Court fol-
lowed the California model. The Dickler court held that the device of
classwide arbitration best addressed two important interests. From the
defense's perspective, Dickler held that classwide arbitration resulted in
the enforcement of the parties' agreement to arbitrate their disputes. 194
Balancing this, from the plaintiffs perspective, classwide arbitration
provided an economically viable alternative that preserved the deterrent
effects and leverage available to plaintiffs from utilization of the class
action device. 195 Dickler also required that the trial court handle the class
certification issues and supervise the notice, but did not expressly adopt
the due process rationale of Keating and its progeny. 96 Instead, again
echoing historic concerns, Dickler indicated that arbitrators were "proba-
bly not equipped nor appropriate for the task of class certification" be-
186. Id.
187. 99 Cal. App. 4th 1106 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
188. Sanders, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 110.
189. 30 Cal. 4th 303 (Cal. 2003). This case was decided with Bazzle pending. Id. at 319 n.5.
190. Id. at 319. The court distinguished judicial supervision and continuing enforcement of a
public injunction, which it held was inarbitrable. (citation omitted).
191. Id.
192. Coleman v. Nat'l Movie-Dine, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 945, 948 (E.D. Pa 1978). Since this
decision, both the NYSE and the NASD have added provisions to their rules providing that claims
submitted for arbitration as class actions are not eligible for arbitration. IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL.,
supra note 156, § 18.9.2.
193. 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
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cause their orders are unreviewable 9rior to a final award and because
they lacked broad subpoena powers.'
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the hybrid
model of classwide arbitration. However, an inherent tension exists be-
tween the lack of confidence in the arbitral process underlying the hybrid
model and the Supreme Court's preference for arbitration, as is discussed
further below.
V. THE BAZZLE DECISION
A. Factual Background
The facts involved two separate contracts entered into by Bazzle,
Lackey and the Buggses with Green Tree Financial Corp. 198  As in
Southland/Keating, the respondents filed separate state court actions
against Green Tree, and the plaintiff, Bazzle, moved for class certifica-
tion. 199 Meanwhile, "Green Tree sought to stay the court proceedings
and compel arbitration."2 ° In the case brought by Bazzle, the state trial
court certified the class and compelled arbitration, (a procedure similar
to what one might expect under the hybrid model of classwide arbitra-
tion) and the arbitrator eventually awarded the class damages and attor-
neys' fees (later confirmed by the trial court).20 '
The Lackeys and the Buggses also sought class certification, and
"Green Tree moved to compel arbitration. 2 °2 The trial court initially
found the parties' agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.20 3 The state ap-
peals court reversed that decision, however, and the parties selected the
same arbitrator later chosen to arbitrate the Bazzle dispute.2°  In the
Lackey/Buggs action, the arbitrator, not the court, certified the class.205
The arbitrator then proceeded to approve a class notice that was sent to
class members, define the membership of the Lackey/Buggs class,2°6 and
eventually award damages and attorneys' fees207 (ultimately confirmed
by the trial court).208
Thus, while the trial court issued the order in the Bazzle matter
granting class certification, and the arbitrator then conducted the class
arbitration proceedings "without further involvement of the trial
197. Id. at 866 n.5.
198. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448-49 (2003).






205. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E. 2d 349, 354 (S.C. 2002).
206. Green Tree, 569 S.E. 2d at 354.
207. Id.
208. Id.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
court,"2°9 the arbitrator in the Lackey/Buggs matter determined that a
class action should proceed within the arbitration, and handled the notice
and certification issues, after interpreting the arbitration clause drafted by
Green Tree.210 Thus, in the Lackey/Buggs action, the trial court operated
consistently with the pure (non-hybrid) model of classwide arbitration,
while in the Bazzle action, the trial court operated more consistently with
the hybrid model in which the court resolves the class-related issues be-
fore sending the matter to arbitration on the merits.
B. The South Carolina Supreme Court's Decision
The South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew both cases from the
appeals court, assumed jurisdiction, and held that the parties' contractual
silence regarding class arbitration permitted classwide arbitration, in the
discretion of the trial court, where such a procedure would serve effi-
ciency and not result in prejudice to the parties .21 The South Carolina
Supreme Court also held that the trial court acted appropriately in order-
ing classwide arbitration where the parties' agreement was silent regard-
212ing classwide arbitration. Lacking United States Supreme Court
precedent regarding classwide arbitration, the South Carolina Supreme
Court examined both the Champ approach and the California (hybrid)
approach to classwide arbitration.
213
On the contract interpretation issue, the South Carolina Supreme
Court cited the strong policy favoring arbitration and the principle that
contracts are construed against the drafter.1 4 The court found that the
contract was silent regarding classwide arbitration and that language
relied upon by Green Tree as precluding classwide arbitration215 at most
created an ambiguity.216 Construing the ambiguity against the drafter,217
the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the Champ approach and
instead followed the approach taken by the California courts in Keating
and the Blue Cross of California v. Superior Court
21s decisions. 219
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the arbitrator did not
act with manifest disregard of the law when certifying the class because
the issue of classwide arbitration was unsettled at the time the arbitrator
209. Id. at 352.
210. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453-54.
211. Id.; Green Tree, 569 S.E.2d at 360.
212. Green Tree, 569 S.E.2d at 360.
213. Id. at 356-57.
214. Id. at 358.
215. Id. at 359. Green Tree relied upon the language providing for arbitration of "disputes,
claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract, or the relationships which result
from this contract" as creating a limitation on classwide arbitration. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 360.
218. Keating, 31 Cal. 3d 584 (Cal. 1982); Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.App.
4th 42, 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
219. Green Tree, 569 S.E. 2d at 360.
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ruled.2'0 Finally, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the claim
by Green Tree that classwide arbitration violated the due process rights
of absent class members.
22
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision made no explicit dis-
tinction between the hybrid model employed in the Bazzle action and the
pure arbitral model employed in the Lackey/Buggs action. The decision
affirmed both procedures, and implicitly endorsed the California model,
without specifically adopting the hybrid aspects of that model.222 As
discussed below, the United States Supreme Court's decision offered no
explicit discussion regarding whether a hybrid or pure model of class-
wide arbitration is appropriate, but implicitly rejected the hybrid model.
C. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court and remanded the case to the arbitrator.223 In doing
so, the Court indicated that the issue of contract interpretation, to wit,
whether the parties' arbitration agreement was silent regarding classwide
arbitration or whether the agreement, as Green Tree argued, precluded
classwide arbitration, was "a matter for the arbitrator to decide."
224
Although the Court did not address the distinction between the hy-
brid model of classwide arbitration used in Bazzle and the pure model of
classwide arbitration used in Lackey/Buggs, the Court's decision implic-
itly endorsed a pure model of arbitration by reserving the decision for the
arbitrator.225 At the same time, the determination implicitly rejected the
hybrid model that would have reserved the issue of the contract interpre-
tation along with other issues concerning the class-related aspects of the
matter, including certification and notice, for the trial courts.
Similar to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Keating,
the Bazzle decision did not address the subject of due process in class-
wide arbitration, leaving the issue for another day.226 Nor did the deci-
220. Id. at 361-62.
221. Id. at 362 (holding that Green Tree had failed to preserve the issue for appeal, but opining
that at any rate, "Green Tree has not articulated precisely how it believes the class members' due
process rights have been violated[,]" and opining in dicta that "the class members' rights appear to
have been properly protected by the notice given to all of them[,]" noting that Green Tree had the
opportunity to object to the notice and failed to do so).
222. Id. at 360.
223. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454.
224. Id. at 447.
225. Id. at 453.
226. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution prohibit the government from
depriving a person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Outside of the classwide arbitration context, because there is no
state action involved in arbitration, due process is not required. Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999); Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190-
91 (11 th Cir. 1995) (holding that confirmation of arbitration award does not constitute state action
sufficient to trigger constitutional protections); Judge Lawrence Waddington, Federalizing Arbitra-
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sion expressly address whether the arbitrator's decision to permit class-
227wide arbitration would exceed the bounds of the arbitrator's power.
However, the plurality's determination that the arbitrator must make the
initial determination regarding whether classwide arbitration is proper
implicitly permits the arbitrator to find classwide arbitration appropri-
ate.228
As to the contract interpretation issue, the plurality opinion by Jus-
tice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter, Scalia and Ginsburg, sided with
the South Carolina Supreme Court rather than the Champ line of author-
ity.22 9 Justice Breyer's opinion indicated that, because the parties agreed
to submit for arbitration "[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising
from or relating to [their] contract or the relationships which result from
[the] contract," the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate permits or
prohibits classwide arbitration (as opposed to an individual arbitration)
was a matter for the arbitrator, not a judge, to decide. 230  This is so, he
reasoned, because "the parties seem to have agreed that an arbitrator, not
a judge, would answer the relevant question. ' 231  Agreeing with the
South Carolina Supreme Court, Justice Breyer relied upon the longstand-
ing principle that courts should resolve doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues "in favor of arbitration.
'" 232
Although the dissent agreed with Green Tree that the contract itself
precluded classwide arbitration, Justice Breyer did not agree that the
233contract was as clear as the dissenters believed. Despite the plurality's
tion-The Development of Arbitration Law Offers a Classic Example of the Clash between Federal
Supremacy and State Sovereignty, Los Angeles Lawyer, 26 Sep L.A. Law. 30, 31-32, 35 (Sept.
2003); Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 369, 393 (2004) (citing Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp.
1460, 1468 (N.D. I11. 1997) and Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc. 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (1 1th Cir. 1995)).
Commentators assert that due process is required in arbitration. Harding, at 394-95; Richard C.
Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 577, 590 (1997); Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 40-47 (1997) [hereinafter Sternlight IM].
227. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451 (indicating by plurality only that the contract's language is not as
clear as Justice Rehnquist's dissent suggests and that the contract interpretation is not completely
obvious). As discussed below, these determinations leave open the possibility that arbitrators will
interpret such agreements as permitting classwide arbitration.
228. Id. at 451-53. This conclusion follows from the premise that the arbitrator must make the
decision regarding whether classwide arbitration is permitted under the parties' agreement, and the
premise that the interpretation of an arbitration agreement silent regarding classwide arbitration is
"not completely obvious." Id. at 451.
229. Although the plurality did not discuss the Champ line of authority, the determination that
the interpretation of the language of an arbitration agreement that is silent regarding classwide arbi-
tration is "not completely obvious," Id. at 451, directly contradicts the holding in Champ that an
arbitration clause that is silent regarding classwide arbitration must be interpreted not to permit
classwide arbitration. Champ v. Seigel Trading Co. Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995).
230. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451-52.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 452 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985)).
233. Id. at 450-51.
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ultimate conclusion that the contract interpretation question was a matter
to be determined by the arbitrator, the plurality offers its own take re-
garding an alternate interpretation of the arbitration clause.234 Here it is
important to examine the express language of the contract, which pro-
vided that disputes "shall be resolved . . . by one arbitrator selected by
... [Green Tree] with [the] consent of... [Green Tree's customer]. 235
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the dissenters interpreted the contract provi-
sion to preclude classwide arbitration because to do otherwise would
ignore the terms of the parties' contract to the extent that classwide arbi-
tration would preclude the parties, specifically here Green Tree, from
selecting the arbitrator in each case. 6
Writing for the plurality, Justice Breyer disagreed that the contract's
language was quite so clear and found that "the answer to this question is
not completely obvious. 237 He noted that Green Tree in fact did select
the class arbitrator with the consent of its customers, and that "insofar as
the other class members agreed to proceed in class arbitration, they con-
sented as well. 238 Justice Breyer observed that "[t]he contracts do not
say 'selected by ... [Green Tree] to arbitrate this dispute and no other
(even identical) dispute with another customer. ' '239 In other words, con-
sistent with the South Carolina Supreme Court, Justice Breyer's opinion
relies heavily on the fact that the arbitration clause did not explicitly ne-
gate classwide arbitration.
240
Justice Breyer also relied upon the "broad authority the contracts
elsewhere bestow upon the arbitrator," including "'all powers,' including
certain equitable powers 'provided by the law and the contract,"' in sup-
port of the conclusion that one cannot directly infer from the silence of
the parties regarding classwide arbitration the conclusion that the parties
intended to preclude the arbitrator from ordering classwide arbitration.
241
The negative implication of these comments regarding the issue of con-
234. Id.
235. Id. at 450 (first, third, and sixth alterations in original).
236. Id. at 458-459 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 451.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Contracts explicitly negating classwide arbitration have been upheld as enforceable by a
number of courts. KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 219-20; Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 153, at
1270. But other courts find such provisions are unconscionable, Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126,
1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002)); Leonard v. Terminix Int'l Co., L.P., 854 So. 2d 529, 539 (Ala. 2002); West Virginia ex rel.
Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 280 (W. Va. 2002); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc. 91 F.
Supp. 2d 1087, 1104-05 (W.D. Mich. 2000); Mandel v. Household Bank (Nev.), Nat'l Ass'n., 129
Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 385-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted 65 P.3d 1284 (Cal. 2003) (holding that
term prohibiting class action in arbitration was unconscionable); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d
570, 576-577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002); cf., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 408-09 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that the FAA preempts state court from applying state substantive law to strike
class action waivers from arbitration agreements), cert. granted 65 P.3d 1285 (Cal. 2003).
241. Bazzle. 539 U.S. at 451.
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tract interpretation is that a clause that does not expressly negate class-
wide arbitration implicitly allows for the possible imposition of such a
procedure by the arbitrator. Corporate drafters who previously put stock
in this more subtle contract interpretation argument must now resort to
drafting express no-class action provisions in order to continue to pre-
serve arbitration while avoiding class actions within arbitration. 242 This
is so even though such language creates some risk that the entire arbitra-
tion provision will be deemed unconscionable in some jurisdictions, as
discussed above. 4 3
Distinguishing the question of classwide arbitration from "gateway
issues" typically decided by a court, the Bazzle plurality decided that an
arbitrator should rule on the appropriateness of classwide arbitration. 244
The Court in Bazzle arguably made the initial determination that the
agreement did not clearly prohibit classwide arbitration.245 Under the
Bazzle opinion's ultimate holding, this issue is for the arbitrator, not the
court to determine.246 Accordingly, if the arbitration agreement did
clearly prohibit classwide arbitration, this determination would still be
for the arbitrator, not the court.247 However, the ambiguity created by the
opinion leaves open for argument the scope of the court's jurisdiction. If
the court, and not the arbitrator, should make the initial determination
regarding whether the agreement clearly prohibits classwide arbitra-
tion,248 perhaps other issues pertaining to the arbitration should also beaddressed by the court.249
Additional language in Justice Breyer's opinion creates limitations
on the role of the courts and expands the role of the arbitrator, moving
the law toward a pure arbitral model for classwide arbitration. Bazzle
reserves the role of the courts in addressing certain gateway matters in-
cluding whether a valid arbitration agreement exists at all and whether an
arbitration clause applies to a particular controversy. 250 However, Justice
Breyer distinguishes this power of the courts from the instant matter
which he characterizes as "what kind of arbitration proceeding the par-
ties agreed to," a matter he indicates "concerns contract interpretation
242. See supra Part II, C.
243. See supra Part III, C.
244. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451.
245. Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355,
359 (5th Cir. 2003).
246. Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 360 (observing the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's plurality opin-
ion in Bazzle, and concluding that, even if the arbitration agreement on its face precluded arbitration,
under the reasoning of the plurality opinion, "arbitrators could ... make [that] call [regarding en-
forceability] without... prior analysis by a court.").
247. Id.
248. KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 251.
249. Lender's counsel Alan Kaplinsky raises the question of whether, after Bazzle, only an
arbitrator can determine the unconscionability of an arbitration clause, whether based upon prohibi-
tion of class action suits or for other reasons. Id. The Pedcor interpretation of the Bazzle plurality
opinion would support such a procedure.
250. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452.
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and arbitration procedures" that "[a]rbitrators are well situated" to han-
dle.25 1 Thus, Bazzle allocates to the arbitrator a broad range of proce-
dural matters involving what type of arbitration should occur.252
The comments of the plurality regarding the contract interpretation
issue are significant because, as discussed below, they validate an alter-
nate contract interpretation that would allow for an arbitrator to interpret
a similar clause to permit classwide arbitration. The plurality's contract
interpretation is arguably dicta, given that the decision delegates the re-
sponsibility for the contract interpretation to the arbitrator.253 But, as
discussed further below, the dicta may effectively preclude challenge to
decisions by arbitrators ordering classwide arbitration by providing sup-
port for the argument that an arbitrator's award permitting classwide
arbitration does not manifestly disregard the law, is not arbitrary or ca-
pricious, and does not violate public policy, and therefore, should not be
vacated.254
Ultimately, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the arbitra-
tor, since the court had made the determination regarding classwide arbi-
tration in the underlying Bazzle case, and because, although the arbitrator
did make the determination regarding the appropriateness of class arbi-
tration in the underlying Lackey/Buggs matter, the Supreme Court be-
lieved that the Bazzle court's determination certifying a class may have
influenced the Lackey/Buggs arbitrator's determination that classwide
arbitration was appropriate.255 Accordingly, the Court remanded the
matter for a determination by the arbitrator (independent of the Court) to
determine whether classwide arbitration is appropriate.256
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the South
Carolina Supreme Court that under South Carolina state law, class action
arbitrations were permissible where the parties' arbitration agreement
was silent.257 Justice Stevens' opinion also acknowledges that there is
nothing in the FAA that would preclude a decision by the South Carolina
Supreme Court permitting classwide arbitration.258 Justice Stevens char-
acterizes the decision to conduct a class action arbitration as "correct as a
251. Id. at 452-53.
252. Peter J. Kreher and Pat D. Robertson Ill, Case Comment, Substance, Process and the
Future of Class Arbitration, 9 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 409, 414 (2004). As mentioned above, fol-
lowing Bazzle, two of the three major arbitration providers adopted specific procedures for classwide
arbitration.
253. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451-52.
254. Review of arbitrators' decisions is limited as provided under section 10 and 11 of the
FAA, and to a narrow scope of judicial review under certain court created exceptions, as discussed
further below.
255. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-53. The Court observed that the Lackey plaintiffs argued that the
arbitrator should impose classwide arbitration because the state trial court had done so earlier in the
Bazzle matter.
256. Id. at 454.
257. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
258. Id. at 454-55.
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matter of law;" accordingly he voted to affirm the judgment, providing a
fifth vote endorsing classwide arbitration.259 Justice Stevens' opinion
provided further support for an arbitrator's decision permitting classwide
arbitration by helping to establish that such a determination did not vio-
late public policy per se, is not arbitrary or capricious, and did not mani-
festly disregard the law.26°
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
dissented on the grounds that the decision regarding whether classwide
arbitration was appropriate was one for the Court and not the arbitra-
tor.26 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning hinges on the provision of the
arbitration agreement that disputes would be resolved "by binding arbi-
tration by one arbitrator selected by us [Green Tree] with consent of
you. ' 262 He asserts that the determination by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court allowing a class action within arbitration ignored the terms
of the parties' contract to the extent that classwide arbitration would pre-
clude one of the parties, specifically Green Tree, from selecting a sepa-
rate and different arbitrator for each individual arbitration with each con-
sumer.263 Therefore, the dissenting Justices concluded that the FAA pro-
visions requiring enforcement of the parties' agreement to arbitrate pre-
empted any classwide arbitration where the result would be to deny
Green Tree's contractual right to select a separate arbitrator for each dis-
pute .2
Justice Thomas provided a sixth vote for leaving undisturbed the
South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion permitting classwide arbitration
265on the grounds that the FAA is not applicable to the states.
D. Beyond Bazzle
Several cases following Bazzle implicitly acknowledge and directly
advance the trend toward a pure arbitral model of classwide arbitration
by directing cases to the arbitrator for decisions regarding not only
whether a class action is permissible pursuant to the parties' agreement,
but also for decisions implementing classwide arbitration, such as class
certification. These decisions signal the forthcoming widespread adop-
tion of a pure model of classwide arbitration, and the demise of the hy-
brid model.
In Pedcor Management Company, Inc. v. Nations Personnel of
Texas, Inc.,216 the Fifth Circuit, applying Bazzle, interpreted an arbitra-
259. Id. at 455.
260. See infra Part VI, B, 1.
261. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 458.
263. Id. at 458-59.
264. Id. at 459-60.
265. Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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tion clause silent regarding classwide arbitration to require that the mat-
ter be submitted to the arbitrator to determine the appropriateness of
267classwide arbitration. At the trial court level, the court certified the
class in preparation for arbitration. 68 Pedcor interpreted the plurality
decision in Bazzle by closely examining the bases for the fifth vote, as
expressed in Justice Stevens' opinion, and found several points criti-
cal.269 First, Justice Stevens would have permitted the class arbitration in
Bazzle to stand.27° Secondly, Justice Stevens also stated that the decision
regarding "the interpretation of the parties' agreement should have been
made in the first instance by the arbitrator, rather than the court."27'
Thus, Pedcor read Justice Stevens' opinion in Bazzle as providing the
fifth vote favoring classwide arbitration.
272
Pedcor interpreted Bazzle's contract interpretation analysis broadly.
Pedcor reads Bazzle to hold that the contract provision "reflected the
parties' intent to commit a broad scope of questions to arbitration, in-
cluding the class arbitration question because that issue 'relat[ed] to the
contract.' 273 In contrast to some who have decried the Bazzle decision
as muddled, the Pedcor opinion cites "[t]he clarity" of the Bazzle hold-
274ing. In line with the reasoning in Bazzle, the Pedcor court concluded
that it was "'not completely obvious' whether the agreement forbids
class arbitration."
275
Pedcor questioned the language in the Bazzle decision, stating that
the Court "must deal . . . at the outset" with the possibility that the con-
tracts expressly prohibit classwide arbitration.276 Instead, Pedcor indi-
cated this determination should, according to the holding in Bazzle, be
made by the arbitrator, not the court.277 Pedcor holds that "it should not
be necessary for a court to decide initially whether an arbitration agree-
ment clearly forbids class arbitration., 278 Given this definition of the
arbitrator's role, arguably even a clause prohibiting classwide arbitration
should be sent to an arbitrator for a determination regarding the uncon-
scionability of such a prohibition.
The Supreme Court of Texas in In re Wood 2 79 also broadly con-
strued the Bazzle decision when it ordered arbitration and "authorized the
266. 343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003).
267. Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 363 (5th Cir. 2003).
268. Id. at 357.
269. Id. at 358.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 358-59.
273. Id. at 359 (citation omitted).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 360 (citation omitted).
276. Id. at 359-60 (citation omitted).
277. Id. at 363.
278. Id. at 360.
279. 140 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2004).
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arbitrator to decide the class action issue.''28° Initially, prior to the Bazzle
decision, the trial court in Wood directed the case to arbitration without
deciding the issue of class certification.2 8 ' The appellate court, imple-
menting the hybrid approach, determined that the court should decide
whether the parties' arbitration agreement (which was silent regarding
class certification) permitted class arbitration.282 The Texas Supreme
Court construed Bazzle as holding that "issues of class arbitration are for
the arbitrator to decide" and concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in
directing the trial court to determine class certification.
28 3 Recognizing
no distinction between the contract interpretation issue addressed in Baz-
zle, i.e., whether the contract permits classwide arbitration, and the dis-
tinct issue of whether the court or arbitrator determines class certifica-
tion, the Texas Supreme Court construed Bazzle broadly as holding that
"arbitrators make class arbitration decisions" and "the arbitrator deter-
mines what the rules in effect governing arbitration are. 284 This inter-
pretation takes the Bazzle holding a step further than Bazzle itself. Baz-
zle requires that the arbitrator determine whether classwide arbitration is
permitted under the parties' agreement.2 85 Wood further requires that the
arbitrator make the decision regarding class certification.
2 86 Wood is
consistent with the underlying rationale of Bazzle, and the shift I expect
the law to take following Bazzle toward a pure arbitral model of class-
wide arbitration.
After over twenty years of exercising court discretion under the hy-
brid model of classwide arbitration, California case law is also yielding,
less readily, to Bazzle. In Garcia v. DirectTV, Inc.287 the California ap-
pellate court announced that until last year, California law permitted
courts to determine whether classwide arbitration was appropriate in any
particular case--"but no longer., 288 Garcia construes Bazzle more nar-
rowly than either Pedcor or Wood. Garcia construes Bazzle to require
only that "the foundational issue-whether a particular arbitration
agreement prohibits class arbitrations-must (in FAA cases) henceforth
be decided by arbitrators. 289 Prior to the Bazzle decision, the trial court
in Garcia had determined that the court, and not the arbitrator, should
address the class action issues, including whether the agreement prohib-
ited class arbitration. 290 The California Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Garcia, vacated the judgment in the case affirming the trial court's
280. In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d at 368.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 368, 370.
284. Id. at 369-70.
285. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453.
286. In re Wood, 140 S.w.3d at 369-70.
287. 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
288. Garcia, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 191.
289. Id. (citation omitted).
290. Id. at 192.
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order that the court would address the class action issues, stayed the case
pending Bazzle, and then remanded for further consideration.29' Follow-
ing Bazzle, the Garcia court decided that the contract interpretation issue
must be determined by the arbitrator.292 On one issue, the Garcia court
reserved judgment, indicating that "[i]mplicit in Bazzle is the notion that,
absent a class action waiver, classwide arbitration is,2 roper under the
FAA-but the Supreme Court has yet to say that is so.
Because the Pedcor and Wood decisions are more consistent with a
pure arbitral paradigm for classwide arbitration, as discussed below, I
anticipate that the law will continue moving in that direction. However,
in much the same way that the courts such as Garcia exhibit hesitation
regarding the adoption of a pure arbitral paradigm, the arbitration pro-
viders are responding to Bazzle in a variety of ways, as discussed in the
next section.
E. Arbitral Procedure: The Providers Respond
The reactions of the three major arbitration providers to classwide
arbitration have varied. This section discusses the response of the
American Arbitration Association (the "AAA"), the issuance of rules by
JAMS, and the decision of the National Arbitral Forum to proceed under
its existing rules which do not specifically address classwide arbitration.
The AAA promulgated the first set of classwide arbitration rules in
October 2003, following the Bazzle decision.294 The AAA rules mirror
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in many respects.295  At the same
time, the AAA rules accommodate the fact that adjudication will occur in
the arbitral setting in a variety of respects by providing, for example, that
notice to the class include the identity of the arbitrator. 296 The AAA will
not accept cases for arbitration where the arbitration clause expressly
prohibits classwide arbitration, unless a court so orders.297 The provi-
sions of the AAA rules are designed to accommodate the hybrid model
of classwide arbitration by expressly permitting the arbitrator to take
direction from the court on class certification and other class-related is-
291. Id.
292. Id. at 196.
293. Id. at 196 n.4.
294. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, available
at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
295. The AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations provide requirements for class
certification similar to those set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), requirements for
the maintenance of a classwide arbitration that are similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3), and authority for the arbitrator to approve settlements that is similar to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 23(e). Other provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 were omitted,
including the provision requiring the court to approve counsel.
296. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, Rule
6(b)(7), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
297. American Arbitration Association, Policy on Class Arbitration, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21944.
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sues. 298 The AAA rules also allow for interim review of certain arbitral
rulings beyond the request for vacatur of a final award available under
the FAA, including review of the Clause Construction Award and the
299Class Determination Award. Under the FAA, there is no authority to
conduct these reviews;300 however, under the hybrid model, a court
maintaining its jurisdiction over the class action-related aspects of the
arbitration could exercise its discretion to conduct such a review.
301
Arbitration provider JAMS also promulgated its rules for class ac-
tion arbitrations. 3°2  These rules differ significantly from the AAA ap-
proach, in that, the JAMS Procedures allow the arbitration to proceed
under a pure arbitral paradigm, with the arbitrator interpreting the con-
tract as authorized by Bazzle, as well as the class certification and all
class-related issues, including notice, through a final award, without re-
quiring the interim reviews embedded in the AAA rules.30 3 Unlike the
AAA, JAMS will accept cases in which there is a class action waiver in
the arbitration clause, and will interpret the clause and rule upon its en-
forceability or unconscionability.3 4 Under the JAMS rules, courts will
review issues regarding the interpretation of the arbitration clause and the
arbitrator's handling of the class-related issues only if the arbitrator, in
his or her discretion, decides to set forth such determinations in a partial
final award subject to immediate court review.305 On the front end of the
process, the JAMS rules will permit the arbitrator to act in the broadest
possible manner, consistent with Bazzle, even including construing arbi-
tration clauses that prohibit classwide arbitration.3°  Compared with the
298. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, Rule 1(c),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
299. In issuing the Class Determination Award, the arbitrator will determine whether to certify
a class for classwide arbitration. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitration, Rule 5(d), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
300. As discussed below, the review permitted under the FAA is limited to a motion to vacate a
final arbitration award. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004).
301. See infra Part IV.
302. JAMS Class Action Procedures, (Feb. 2005) available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/
classaction-print.asp.
303. Id. Under JAMS Class Action Procedures, (Feb. 2005), in the discretion of the Arbitrator,
the Arbitrator's determinations regarding the construction of the arbitration clause and the certifica-
tion of the class may be set forth in partial final awards subject to immediate court review. JAMS
Class Action Procedures, (Feb. 2005), Rule 2 and 3(c).
304. Id. at Rule 2. JAMS announced on November 12, 2004, that in consumer cases, JAMS
will not enforce clauses that waive consumer's rights to arbitrate their claims in a class action arbi-
tration. Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Takes Steps to Ensure Fairness in Consumer Arbitrations
(November 12, 2004). JAMS later reversed this position. Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Reaffirms
Commitment to Neutrality Through Withdrawal of Class Action Arbitration Waiver Policy (Mar. 10,
2005).
305. Id.
306. At the ABA Annual Meeting Ultimate Arbitration Update session in August 2004, several
panelists and audience members expressed concern that an arbitrator would have a conflict of inter-
est in deciding both clause construction and unconscionability issues, since the arbitrator's continued
employment in the matter in question depended upon the arbitrator's determination that a clause
silent regarding classwide arbitration in fact permitted the procedure or, in the case of an arbitration
provision prohibiting classwide arbitration, an arbitrator's ruling that a class action waiver was
unconscionable or violated public policy. Others speculated that arbitrators ruling that arbitration
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AAA rules, the JAMS procedures accommodate a narrower range of
court intrusion into the arbitral process.
Finally, the National Arbitral Forum arbitrators continue to proceed
under their own Code of Procedure, which at the present time does not
specifically address classwide arbitration.3 °7
VI. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION
In this Part, I examine the preemptive scope of federal arbitration
law as applied to classwide arbitration. After considering general princi-
ples of preemption and prior jurisprudence regarding the scope of FAA
preemption, I discuss several models of preemption analysis. In the fol-
lowing Part, I evaluate the continuing persuasiveness of the case law
prohibiting classwide arbitration, and the viability of both the pure and
hybrid models of classwide arbitration in light of these principles.3 8
A. The Scope of Preemption of Federal Arbitration Law
Since the FAA provides no procedure regarding classwide arbitra-
tion, the question of whether classwide arbitration is preempted depends
upon the extent to which state arbitration law is preempted by federal
arbitration law; and this in turn involves balancing preemption principles
with federalism concerns.3° Where federal and state laws conflict, under
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 0 federal law preempts state
law; this is also true, to a certain extent, with the FAA.3 ' The FAA does
not expressly preempt the entirety of state law regarding arbitration.3" 2
As to many aspects of arbitration, including classwide arbitration, the
FAA offers only "minimalist" guidance, leaving a "large penumbra" for
state law. 3 13 It is also well established that state arbitration provisions
clauses permitted classwide arbitration would find such a ruling a career ending determination, since
such arbitrators would never again be selected by businesses to arbitrate. Author's notes of presenta-
tion by Robert Davidson, Executive Director of JAMS Arbitration Practice at the August 2004 ABA
Annual Meeting Ultimate Arbitration Update (Aug. 8, 2004) (on file with the author).
307. The National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure can be located at http://www.arb-
forum.com/programs/code-new/. At the most recent ABA Annual Meeting session on the Ultimate
Arbitration Update, Edward C. Anderson, Managing Director for the National Arbitration Forum,
indicated that arbitrators with the NAF proceed under Rule 20 regarding classwide arbitration. Rule
20 provides that "[a]rbitrators have the powers provided by this Code, by the agreement of the Par-
ties, and the applicable substantive law." Mr. Anderson advised the author that the NAF is consider-
ing whether to provide new rules regarding arbitration. Author's notes of presentation by Robert
Davidson, Executive Director of JAMS Arbitration Practice at the August 2004 ABA Annual Meet-
ing Ultimate Arbitration Update (Aug. 8, 2004) (on file with the author).
308. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 397
(2004) [hereinafter Drahozal 11]; Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A
State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175 (2002).
309. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 178.
310. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
311. WARE I, supra note 15 at 38-39.
312. Drahozal nI, supra note 308, at 397-98.
313. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 178-79.
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can address "procedural" considerations involved in arbitration,31 4 but
only "subject to the general pro-arbitration policies articulated in the
FAA" and the "gravitational pull of the FAA's pro-arbitration impera-
tive." '3 15
The Supreme Court established the "preemptive core" 316 of the fed-
eral arbitration law in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 3 17 where the Court
held that the language of Section 2, specifically the phrase "involving
commerce," reflected congressional intent to regulate beyond the scope
of federal procedural law and to "foreclose state legislative attempts to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.38 In Southland,
the Court stated that by enacting Section 2 of the FAA, Congress "with-
drew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution
of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitra-
tion. 319
Where the FAA conflicts with state law, state law is preempted, ex-
cept to the extent permitted by Section 2 of the FAA, which permits arbi-
tration clauses to be revoked upon "grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract. 3 20  Southland found that nothing in
the FAA allowed the creation of any additional limitations under state
law.321 Thus, even though Congress did not intend to fully preempt state
law in the area of arbitration, state law is preempted to the extent that it
"conflicts with federal law" or "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'
322
If the application of state arbitration law results in less "'validity, en-
forceability, or irrevocability' of arbitration agreements," then that law is
323preempted. From this authority it is evident that the issue of preemp-
314. While class action law generally is viewed as more of a matter of "procedure," the "sub-
stantive implications of the class action remedy have been widely recognized." David S. Schwartz,
Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability and Preclusion Princi-
ples, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 99-100 (2003).
315. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 178.
316. Id. at 194.
317. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
318. Drahozal n, supra note 308, at 399-400 (citation omitted); IAN R. MACNEtL, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 145 (1992).
MacNeil disagrees with Chief Justice Burger's interpretation of the legislative history underlying the
Supreme Court's majority opinion in Southland. Other commentators suggest that, while the South-
land opinion incorrectly construes the FAA's legislative history, the Court's conclusion regarding
the scope of FAA preemption is correct. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Preemption Under the
FAA-Revisiting Southland-Supreme Court's Reasoning Weak, but Conclusion Correct, DISP.
RESOL. MAO. 23 (Spring 2004) [hereinafter Drahozal 1ml].
319. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (emphasis added).
320. WARE II, supra note 15, at 31-32 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
321. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-11 (citation omitted).
322. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
(1989).
323. 1 IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND




tion hinges upon whether the state law undermines the enforceability of
the agreement to arbitrate.
The FAA applies in both state and federal courts 324 and, despite ex-
tensive scholarly criticism, 325 as the law now stands, federal arbitration
law preempts state law 326 to the extent that state law places arbitration
agreements on "unequal footing" as compared with other contracts.327
Thus, while state law governing an arbitration agreement may apply if
the law does not "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA," 328 a
state law that renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable or requires
a judicial forum for disputes that the parties agreed to arbitrate is pre-
empted by federal law,329 as is any state law that undermines the enforce-
ability of arbitration clauses with respect to certain types of claims.
330
The displacement of state arbitration law by federal arbitration law
can result from conflict between the state law and a particular FAA pro-
vision or a conflict between the state law and general arbitration law.33'
For example, a New York law requiring a higher standard of proof for
arbitration contracts than that required for non-arbitration contracts was
held preempted by federal law.332 A state law creating a preference for a
judicial forum is also preempted because such a preference is inconsis-
tent with the FAA.333
Section 2 of the FAA provides that a written agreement to arbitra-
tion in any contract involving interstate commerce shall be valid and
enforceable, except on "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract., 334 Section 2 is applicable in both state and fed-
eral courts, so that a procedural statute or rule that frustrates the effec-
tiveness of the FAA is preempted by federal law,335 while state statutes
or rules that serve to further, rather than to undermine, the enforcement
of arbitration agreements are followed in state court proceedings.336 To
the extent that the parties choose in their agreement to have state law
324. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.395,404-05 (1967).
325. Drahozal 1U, supra note 318, at 27 (citing academic commentators who have "lined up
behind Justice O'Connor['s]" dissent in Southland in which she expressed the opinion that "history
establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable
only in federal courts.").
326. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16.
327. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
328. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78.
329. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 281.
330. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996);
Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc. 275 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2001).
331. 1 MACNEIL, supra note 323, at § 10.8.3.
332. Id. at § 10.8.1 (citing Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Vene-
zuela, 991 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1993)).
333. Id. at § 10.8.1.2 (Supp. 1999) (citing Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 968
F.2d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 1992)).
334. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
335. WARE II, supra note 15, at 32-33; Southland, 465 U.S. at 16; Dobson, 513 U.S. at 281.
336. Blue Cross of Cal. v. Sup. Court, 67 Cal. App. 4th 42, 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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apply, courts will enforce that choice as long as the state laws in question
do not conflict with the FAA.337 Laws that effectively deny enforcement
of arbitration agreements on grounds that are exclusive to arbitration are
preempted by the FAA and are unenforceable.
338
Because the FAA does not address classwide arbitration, and state
statutes do not address the subject of classwide arbitration, all of the law
governing the subject derives from either federal or state case law. The
scope of federal preemption extends to preclude state law whether cre-
ated judicially or by statute.339 Just as federal arbitration law preempts
statutes enacted by states that have the effect of precluding or limiting
arbitration, judicial doctrines that have the effect of precluding or limit-
340ing arbitration are also preempted by federal arbitration law.
According to these general principles of FAA preemption, courts
have determined that federal arbitration law preempts state laws declar-
ing pre-dispute arbitration agreements "void, ' 341 state laws making arbi-
tration agreements unenforceable as to certain types of claims,342 and
state laws precluding enforcement of agreements to arbitrate specific
types of claims.343 Federal arbitration law also preempts state laws mak-
ing arbitration unenforceable in certain types of transactions 344 and state
laws raising the standard for assent to arbitration agreements. 345 Courts
have also held that state public policy defenses to the enforceability of
arbitration agreements are preempted by federal arbitration law.
346
Professor Drahozal proposes a four step analytical framework for
determining whether the FAA preempts a state law governing arbitra-
tion.347 The first step is to analyze whether the state law subject to pre-
emption applies to contracts generally, or singles out arbitration contracts
for special treatment.348 State laws that apply only to arbitration agree-
ments will not survive federal preemption.349  Under this step of the
analysis, if the law applies exclusively to arbitration, it is preempted.35°
337. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
338. WARE II, supra note 15, at 35-36.
339. Blue Cross, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 59 n.6 (citation omitted).
340. David S. Schwartz, Federal Preemption Under the FAA: FAA Preemption: Does it Wipe
Out State Contract Law?, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2004, at 23.
341. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 281; WARE II, supra note 15, at 33.
342. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
343. WARE II, supra note 15, at 32; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-491 (1987).
344. WARE H, supra note 15, at 36.
345. Id. at 37-38; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 684-87.
346. WARE 1H, supra note 15, at 36 (citing 2 IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION
LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, § 16.6.1
(1994 & Supp. 1999)).
347. Drahozal II, supra note 308, at 407-08.
348. Id. at 407-11. This step in the analytical framework derives from Section 2 of the FAA.
349. Id. at 408.
350. Id. at 407-08.
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The second step in Professor Drahozal's analytical framework in-
volves determining whether the parties expressly contracted for the ap-
plication of state law to the arbitration proceeding. 35' This step in the
analysis is intended to accommodate the holding in Volt Info. Sciences,
Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,352 as modified by the Mastrobuono
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.35 3 decision.354
The third step in Professor Drahozal's analytical framework evalu-
ates whether the state law in question "invalidate[s], the parties' arbitra-
tion agreement, in whole or in part, conditionally or unconditionally (i.e.,
does application of the state law result in the parties going to court even
though they have agreed to arbitrate their dispute)? If so, the law is pre-
empted., 355 In evaluating whether state law invalidates the parties' con-
tract, some courts have held that certain cases are not appropriate for
arbitration,356 while others (the better view) hold that "state rule[s] ex-
cluding claims from arbitration because arbitration is 'inappropriate'
[are] preempted by the FAA. 357
The fourth factor under Professor Drahozal's test requires the evalua-
tion of the state law under one of several "alternative preemption theo-
ries"-the Keystone Theory; the RUAA Theory; the Anti-FAA Theory,
the Pro-Contract Theory or the FAA Exclusivity Theory. 358 The Key-
stone Theory provides that a state law is not preempted when it does not
"nullif[y] either party's obligation to arbitrate their dispute." 359  The
RUAA Theory encompasses "the view of FAA preemption used by the
drafters of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act." 360 Under this theory,
state laws dealing with "front-end" issues (arbitrability and the agree-
ment to arbitrate) are most likely preempted, particularly those that "go
to the essence of the agreement to arbitrate." 361 Under this theory, the
FAA preempts state laws that alter the terms of the parties' agreements
such that the procedure being enforced is no longer "arbitration." 362 Pro-
fessor Drahozal indicates that a "state law providing that all arbitration
proceedings shall be presided over by a state court judge would be pre-
empted under this theory, even though the parties proceeded to 'arbitra-
tion' .,,363
351. Id. at 408.
352. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
353. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
354. Drahozal I1, supra note 308, at 412.
355. Id. at 408.
356. Id. at 416.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 408.
359. Id. at 417 (citing Keystone Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998)).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 418.
363. Id.
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Professor Drahozal's "Pro-Contract Theory" of preemption holds
that "[a] state law that does not invalidate the parties' arbitration agree-
ment is preempted if it conflicts with a provision in that agreement.
'364
Professor Drahozal describes the Pro-Contract Theory as "broader" than
the RUAA Theory in that "any state law that conflicts with a term in the
parties' arbitration agreement (by singling out arbitration) is pre-
empted., 365 Finally, Professor Drahozal describes the "FAA Exclusivity
Theory" as perhaps the broadest theory of all, in that, under this theory,
"[a]ll state laws that single out arbitration are preempted. 366
The role of state arbitration law is narrower under the FAA than the
role of state contract law.367 The FAA does not preempt state arbitration
law "[s]o long as state law seeks to promote commercial arbitration and
to give effect to the parties' contractual choices." 368 The federal policy
favoring arbitration does not give preference to any particular set of pro-
cedural rules.369 Accordingly, states may utilize their own procedures in
arbitration to the extent they are not inconsistent with the FAA.
While courts determining the scope of the FAA's preemption of
state law can turn to contract law under Section 2 of the FAA to deter-
mine the applicability of state contract law, whether in FAA cases (in-
volving interstate commerce) the courts should ever turn to state arbitra-
tion law is a markedly different question from whether they should turn
to state general contract law. In the case of arbitration law, the courts do
not have to turn anywhere; they can treat the FAA and its penumbra of
general federal arbitration law as plenary.
370
Plainly, state law relating to arbitration (as opposed to state contract
law) does not fall within the savings clause of FAA Section 2. State
law principles, whether legislative or judicial, that take their meaning
from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue, do not fall within the
ambit of the Section 2 savings clause.372 Because of this, state arbitration
law cannot restrict or contradict federal arbitration law, but may supple-
ment it in a manner that is not in conflict with the FAA.373 Wherever
364. Id. at 419.
365. Id.
366. Id. (pointing out that, while this theory does not reflect present case law, it provides a
useful comparison).
367. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 176-77 (describing the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence as sending "mixed signals" regarding the role of state law: on one hand, leaving no latitude for
state regulation through laws that negate arbitration, while on the other hand leaving no room for
federal regulation of arbitration in the area of contract law).
368. Id. at 193-94.
369. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 n.5.
370. 1 MACNEIL, supra note 323, at § 10.6.2.
371. Id. at § 10.8.1.
372. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
373. 1 MACNEIL, supra note 323, at § 10.8.1.
[Vol. 82:2
CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION
state arbitration law falls afoul either of a particular FAA provision or of
federal general arbitration law, it is preempted by the FAA.374
A corollary to this general precept is that because the cardinal pur-
pose of the FAA is contract enforcement, parties to an arbitration agree-
ment can sometimes avoid preemption by agreeing that a particular state
law rather than federal law will apply.375 Because arbitration under the
FAA is most importantly a contract matter, the parties may agree to in-
corporate state law 376 "to displace FAA silence," but only where state
procedure is "manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral pro-
cess."
377
This corollary is further limited, however, by the proviso that, while
the parties may agree to incorporate a state law by expressly referencing
it in their contract, a general choice of law clause will be held to incorpo-
rate only state contract law, not state arbitration law.37 8  Further, the
corollary "dissolves . . . when a generic choice of law clause refers to
state law that is hostile to arbitration." 379 Harmonizing Volt and Mastro-
buono clarifies the scope of permissible state arbitration law: state ex-
perimentation with arbitration procedure will survive preemption as long
as the state arbitration law does not limit arbitration or conflict with the
purposes of the FAA.380
Although Bazzle does not discuss federal preemption per se, the
specific facts in Bazzle inform the Court's most recent pronouncement
regarding the role of state law in arbitration. In Bazzle, the parties agreed
381that South Carolina law would govern their agreement, so the scope of
the Bazzle holding is not limited to contracts exclusively controlled by
382the FAA, but also governs contracts electing state law. One court re-
cently limited the role of state law even further by holding that the par-
ties' selection of the "law of a state" in their contract constitutes a selec-
tion to apply the FAA (which generally does apply to states) as well as a
selection of state-specific law, where the choice of law clause does not
exclude the application of federal law.383
374. Id. at § 10.8.2.
375. WARE nI, supra note 15, at 38-39; Volt, 489 U.S. at 479; cf. Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995) (holding where the parties did not contract out of FAA
preemption effectively, arbitrator could award punitive damages otherwise prohibited by New York
law).
376. Drahozal I1, supra note 308, at 413.
377. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 197 (citation omitted).
378. Drahozal HI, supra note 308, at 413 (comparing Volt and Mastrobuono).
379. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 198.
380. Id. at 199.
381. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring).
382. Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 361.
383. Id. at 361-62 n.30 (expressing "no opinion on whether arbitration agreements governed
exclusively by state arbitration law would be controlled by the Court's holding in Green Tree.").
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Following Bazzle, the Pedcor court recognized that "the FAA pre-
empts state laws that contradict the purpose of the FAA by 'requiring a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration.' 384 Pedcor continued, in dicta, to indi-
cate that "even if Texas law contained a rule contrary to [Bazzle], i.e.,
that courts may decide the class arbitration question, the simultaneous
applicability of the FAA to this case would appear to preempt any con-
trary state law. 385
The California court in Garcia acknowledged that given the pre-
emptive scope of the FAA, it is "immaterial that, under California law,
the class arbitration issues would be decided by the court rather than the
arbitrator., 386 These cases recognize that Bazzle and preemption cases
limit the role of state courts in creating arbitral procedure.
VII. TOWARD A PURE ARBITRAL PARADIGM FOR CLASSWIDE
ARBITRATION
387Because the FAA is silent regarding classwide arbitration, one
must examine federal arbitration law and apply principles of preemption
to determine which models of classwide arbitration are preempted and
which are permissible. Applying these principles to classwide arbitration
leads to three important conclusions. First, laws prohibiting classwide
arbitration, whether federal or state, judicial or statutory, are implicitly
overruled by Bazzle and its progeny, and are preempted by federal arbi-
tration law because such prohibitions are now inconsistent with federal
arbitration law. 388  Second, laws permitting a pure arbitral model of
classwide arbitration, whether federal or state, whether judicial or statu-
tory, particularly when the parties' agreement is silent regarding class-
wide arbitration, are not preempted by federal arbitration law,389 because
such laws are generally consistent with federal arbitration law. 390 Third,
laws creating a hybrid model of classwide arbitration requiring or permit-
ting ongoing involvement of the courts during classwide arbitration are
preempted by federal arbitration law because such procedures are incon-
sistent with federal arbitration law.3 9 ' Thus, federal arbitration law, in-
cluding Bazzle, endorses the holding of Keating and its progeny permit-
384. Id. at 362 (citing Southland, 465 U. S. at 10).
385. Id.
386. Garcia v. DirecTV, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 297, 303 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
387. Drahozal II, supra note 308, at 422.
388. Whether contracts prohibiting classwide arbitration are enforceable, unconscionable or
violate public policy remains an open question. See discussion Part n1 supra.
389. Blue Cross, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 785, 794.
390. Drahozal I, supra note 308, at 422; but see Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 458-59 (Rehnquist, C.J.
dissenting).




ting classwide arbitration but preempts the hybrid model of classwide
arbitration.
A. Bazzle Implicitly Overrules Prior Law Prohibiting Classwide Arbitra-
tion
Although Bazzle does not address much of the prior case law pro-
hibiting classwide arbitration, some commentators assert that Bazzle
overruled the Champ line of authority.392 This issue is critical to deter-
mining whether an arbitrator's decision interpreting an arbitration
agreement to allow classwide arbitration will survive judicial review on a
motion to vacate such a ruling. Certainly Bazzle has limited dramati-
cally, if not eliminated, the opportunity of parties drafting arbitration
agreements to leverage arbitration to defeat class actions, particularly
where the parties' arbitration agreement is silent regarding classwide
arbitration. 393 This Part examines the extent to which the Bazzle decision
has dramatically altered the landscape regarding classwide arbitration
and implicitly given birth to a pure arbitral paradigm for classwide arbi-
tration by addressing two questions not expressly addressed by Bazzle.
Below, I address the legal viability of the Champ line of federal au-
thority and similar state cases prohibiting classwide arbitration and ex-
plain that Bazzle has implicitly overruled Champ's dual rationales by
rendering the lack of power rationale moot and by rejecting the contract
interpretation rationale.
Later I examine whether the hybrid model of classwide arbitration
remains viable, given the preemptive scope of federal arbitration law and
describe how the Bazzle opinion generally endorses the concept of
classwide arbitration and implicitly rejects the hybrid model in favor of a
pure arbitral model of classwide arbitration. I assert that the demise of
the hybrid model of classwide arbitration is compelled not only by Baz-
zle, but also by virtue of the preemptive scope of federal arbitration law.
The U. S. Supreme Court in Bazzle did not expressly address the
line of authority and did not discuss or even allude to any of the prior
federal appellate level decisions restricting classwide arbitration. 394 Be-
cause of this, an analysis of the rationales for the Champ line of cases
must be juxtaposed against the premises of the Bazzle decision to deter-
mine whether Bazzle overrules the long line of cases precluding class-
wide arbitration under an arbitration agreement that is silent regarding
392. Smit, supra note 143, at 175-76 ("The Supreme Court properly ruled these decisions to be
erroneous ... "); Peter J. Kreher & Pat D. Robertson 1II, Case Comment: Substance, Process and the
Future of Class Arbitration, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 409, 421-422 (2004) ("The Bazzle decision
overrules this line of cases by allowing an arbitrator to certify a class when an agreement is silent or
ambiguous on that issue.").
393. Kennedy & Appleby, supra note 155 at 85.
394. Id. at 86.
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classwide arbitration. Below, I analyze the continuing viability of each
rationale after Bazzle.
1. Bazzle Renders the "Lack of Authority" Rationale Moot
After Bazzle, and following promulgation of the AAA's classwide
arbitration rules and the JAMS class action procedures, the lack of a
court's authority to order classwide arbitration is a moot point. Under
the lack of power rationale, courts posited that they possessed no author-
ity to send class action matters to arbitration. 395 After Bazzle, the court's
role is limited to sending the case to the arbitrator if it determines that the
parties agreed to arbitrate the controversy.396 After Bazzle, an arbitration
claimant's motion to the court for class certification is arguably inappro-
priate.39 According to Bazzle, after the court sends the matter to arbitra-
tion, the arbitrator, not the court, must decide the appropriateness of
classwide arbitration. 398 Although the Champ line of authority constrains
the court from ordering classwide arbitration, as the Champ court itself
acknowledges, the lack of court authority does not constrain the arbitra-
tor from ordering classwide arbitration because the arbitrator must oper-
ate according to the agreement of the parties and pursuant to the rules of
the arbitration provider.
399
A related premise for the lack of authority rationale was that the
court lacked the authority to consolidate arbitrations. After Bazzle, the
court's lack of power to consolidate arbitration is meaningless because it
is the arbitrator, not the court, who must decide whether class arbitration
is appropriate. 400 Thus, the Bazzle ruling bypasses the obstacle of the
lack of power, rendering one of the primary rationales for the Champ line
of authority impotent to prevent classwide arbitration. Certainly, the lack
of a court's power to order classwide arbitration cannot serve as a con-
straint on the arbitrator, since the arbitrator's conduct is regulated by the
agreement of the parties and the rules of the arbitration provider. If the
arbitrator determines that the parties' agreement permits classwide arbi-
tration and the arbitration provider's rules authorize the arbitrator to con-
duct classwide arbitration, the lack of power on the part of the court to
consolidate arbitration or order classwide arbitration creates no impedi-
ment to the arbitrator doing so.
395. See discussion Part m, B, supra.
396. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453.
397. Id. at 453-54; Wood, 140 S.W.3d at 370.
398. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-53.
399. Champ, 55 F.3d at 276-77.
400. Bazzle. 539 U.S. at 452-53.
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2. Bazzle Also Undermines the "Contract Interpretation Rationale"
The contract interpretation rationale of the line of federal and state
authority prohibiting classwide arbitration under a clause silent regarding
classwide arbitration is also significantly undermined by the Bazzle deci-
sion. The Champ line of authority and related cases held that an arbitra-
tion clause that is silent regarding classwide arbitration could not be in-
terpreted, as a matter of contract interpretation, to permit classwide arbi-
tration because such a provision could not be "read into" the contract.401
While Bazzle did not discuss this line of authority, the decision im-
plicitly defeats its logic. Bazzle addresses the contract interpretation
issue by examining the breadth of the parties' agreement to arbitrate.
40
2
If the parties intended their disputes to be resolved by the arbitrator, the
court should send the matters to arbitration without resolving the class
action issue.4 3 In view of the broad language of the arbitration clause,
Bazzle describes the contract interpretation as "not completely obvi-
ous."404 This conclusion overrules the determination by lower courts that
a broad arbitration clause could not be interpreted to permit classwide
arbitration.
The determination that an arbitrator must decide whether the
arbitration clause permits classwide arbitration also undermines the
contract interpretation rationale of the prior lower court decisions. If an
arbitrator must decide the question, implicit in that determination is the
possibility that the arbitrator may find that the clause permits classwide
arbitration. Because Bazzle implicitly undermines the dual rationales of
the prior authority, even though it does not discuss that authority, Bazzle
implicitly overrules the prior case law prohibiting classwide arbitration
under a "silent" arbitration clause, requiring arbitrators to make such
decisions and permitting arbitrators to interpret "silent" contracts to
permit classwide arbitration.
B. Laws Permitting a Pure Arbitral Model of Classwide Arbitration are
Viable
The language of the Bazzle plurality opinion and the expansive pre-
emptive scope of federal arbitration law 4°5 assures the ongoing viability
and likely expansion of classwide arbitration under a pure arbitral model
in which judicial involvement is limited to the narrow role circumscribed
by the Federal Arbitration Act4°6 rather than the more intrusive judicial
401. See Part II, B, supra.
402. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451-52.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 451.
405. See Part VI, supra; Drahozal II, supra note 308, at 409.
406. 9 U.S.C. § 2-4 (2004) (compelling arbitration and staying litigation); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004)
(motions to vacate arbitration awards).
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role preserved by the hybrid model of classwide arbitration. °7 By decid-
ing that an arbitrator can determine whether to adjudicate a matter the
parties agreed to arbitrate through classwide arbitration, 408 the Bazzle
Court implicitly endorsed the implementation of classwide arbitration,
particularly where the arbitration clause involved is silent regarding
whether the parties contemplated classwide arbitration.4°9 By its implicit
rejection of the line of authority prohibiting classwide arbitration, the
Bazzle opinion implicitly endorses the analysis in Keating41° and its
progeny4  holding that class actions and arbitrations are not inherently
incompatible4 12 and that the combination of the two is preferable to the
option of eliminating plaintiffs' rights to proceed via class adjudication
when they agree to arbitration.1 3
The Bazzle plurality does not address the issue of federal preemp-
tion.4t4 But the Bazzle decision is consistent with the Court's prior pre-
emption analysis. Clearly classwide arbitration does not derive from
state contract law, and therefore the savings clause415 is inapplicable to
bring state or federal procedures permitting classwide arbitration within
the penumbra of federal arbitration law. The law permitting classwide
arbitration is judicially created.41 6 Because states may supplement fed-
eral arbitration law with procedural law pertaining to arbitration, as long
as such procedures do not restrict or contradict federal arbitration law,417
permitting classwide arbitration is conceptually consistent with the pro-
arbitration imperative of the FAA and the national policy favoring arbi-
tration of disputes. Permitting classwide arbitration also places arbitra-
tion agreements on an "equal footing" with other contracts not permitting
arbitration by preserving the right of claimants to pursue a class action
whether they choose an arbitral or judicial forum.
Applying Professor Drahozal's analytical model of federal preemp-
tion also strongly suggests that federal arbitration law does not preempt
the pure arbitral paradigm of classwide arbitration. 418 The first step in
Professor Drahozal's analysis yields the conclusion that state laws per-
407. See Part IV, supra.
408. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453.
409. Undoubtedly a new wave of arbitration agreements expressly precluding classwide arbi-
tration will follow.
410. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209.
411. Lewis, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 75-76; Izzi, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 322; Dickler, 596 A2d at 867; Blue
Cross, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 64.
412. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209.
413. Id.
414. The dissent in Bazzle would have held that federal arbitration law preempted state law
permitting classwide arbitration because such law contradicted the intentions of the parties as stated
in their agreement. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 460 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
415. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
416. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1208 (noting that there is an "absence of direct authority either
supporting or rejecting [the classwide arbitration] procedure").
417. See supra Part lV.
418. Drahozal 11, supra note 308, at 407-412.
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mitting classwide arbitration do not "single out" arbitration contracts for
special treatment. 419 State laws generally permit class actions in the judi-
cial system.42° While a state law precluding classwide arbitration would
single out arbitration situations for special treatment, state case law that
permits class actions within arbitration provides treatment for arbitrated
matters that is no different than that accorded to cases remaining in the
judicial system.
The second step in Professor Drahozal's analysis requires an
evaluation of whether the parties expressly agreed that state law should
apply to their agreement. 421 Assuming that the parties did so, and that
state law such as Keating, Bazzle and their progeny permitted classwide
arbitration, then the application of state law to permit classwide arbitra-
tion would not result in any preemption problem.
The third step in Professor Drahozal's analysis addresses whether
the state law invalidates the parties' agreement to arbitrate, in whole or in
part; if so, the law is preempted.422 If the state law permits classwide
arbitration (assuming a non-hybrid model, which is discussed in the next
section), then the application of such a law would not impermissibly re-
sult in the parties going to court, rather than resolving their dispute
through arbitration. Applying state law permitting classwide arbitration
is consistent with the parties' agreement to arbitrate their disputes. Ap-
plication of the Keystone Theory would not invalidate the law because a
state law permitting classwide arbitration does not nullify the agreement
of either party to arbitrate the dispute.423 Under the RUAA Theory, be-
cause the state law permitting classwide arbitration does not vitiate the
agreement to arbitrate, it should not be preempted. 424 According to the
FAA-Exclusivity Theory, classwide arbitration would not be preempted
since it gives effect to the parties' contractual choices insofar as the par-
ties selected arbitration.425
As the dissent in Bazzle points out, the contractual choice of the
corporate party to use a separate arbitrator for each individual arbitration
is not honored by the imposition of the class action device.42 6 This anti-
contractual intent side-effect does not vitiate classwide arbitration be-
cause, in the view of the plurality and Justice Stevens, the parties' fun-
damental contractual choice to arbitrate their disputes is honored through
419. Id. at 409.
420. ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13.1-13.4,
13.12-13.13 (4th ed. 2003).
421. Drahozal H, supra note 308, at 408.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 417.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 419.
426. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459.
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classwide arbitration.4 7 To the extent that contractual language requires
the selection of an individual arbitrator for each arbitrable dispute, with
the intention of eliminating the claimants' right to file a class action by
virtue of their agreement to arbitrate, arbitrators may find such provi-
sions unconscionable or violative of public policy.428 Arbitrators might
also construe such language as ambiguous when juxtaposed with a broad
arbitration clause directing all of the parties' disputes to arbitration,429
and construe such ambiguous contract language against the drafter430 to
permit classwide arbitration in view of such ambiguity, 43' consistent with
the plurality and Justice Stevens' concurrence in Bazzle.
The Pro-Contract Theory raises the same issue.432 The Pro-Contract
Theory holds that state laws not invalidating the parties' agreement are
preempted if such laws contradict the terms of the parties' arbitration
agreement.433 While the dissenters in Bazzle asserted that state law per-
mitting classwide arbitration is preempted because such a procedure con-
flicted with the parties' contractual rights to select individual arbitrators
for each individual dispute,4 4 this assertion failed to carry the day in
Bazzle and additional arguments could defeat it in subsequent cases.435
As a matter of federal preemption, the key conceptual issue is
whether classwide arbitration is inconsistent with the purposes of the
FAA, with federal arbitration law, and with the national policy favoring
arbitration. Bazzle's implicit endorsement of classwide arbitration rests
on the premise that classwide arbitration is fundamentally consistent with
the purposes of federal arbitration law in the broadest sense.
427. Id. at 451-52 (as Justice Breyer points out, the contracts in question did not say that the
arbitrator must be selected by Green Tree "to arbitrate this dispute and no other (even identical)
dispute with another customer."); see e.g., Cole v. Long John Silver's Rests., Inc., Clause Construc-
tion Award of Arbitrator, 7, available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1659 ("The use of personal
pronouns cannot by inference achieve the deprivation of significant rights.").
428. Such contract drafting would have the same effect as an arbitration clause requiring arbi-
tration, but precluding classwide arbitration, a provision that some court have already found uncon-
scionable. See supra Part I. At least some courts have found such clauses both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable. Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
clauses prohibiting class arbitration are intended to prevent plaintiffs from seeking redress for small
claims in a collective action, and to create virtual immunity from class or representative actions,
despite their potential merit); Ting, 319 F.3d at 1150.
429. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451 (The plurality states, "We do not believe, however, that the con-
tracts' language is as clear as The Chief Justice believes," and "Do the contracts forbid class arbitra-
tion? Given the broad authority the contracts elsewhere bestow on the arbitrator ... the answer is
not completely obvious.").
430. Green Tree, 569 S.E.2d at 358; see, e.g., Stemlight I, supra note 133, at 90; Cole v. Long
John Silver's Rests., Inc., Clause Construction Award of Arbitrator, 4, available at
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1659 (construing the language of the clause as creating an ambiguity to
be construed against the drafter).
431. Sternlight I, supra note 133 at 90; see, e.g., Cole v. Long John Silver's Rests., Inc., Clause
Construction Award of Arbitrator, 4, available at http://www.adr.org/si.aspid=1659.
432. Drahozal 1, supra note 308, at 419.
433. Id.
434. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
435. See supra notes 426-30.
CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION
In addition to the theoretical justifications for the pure arbitral
model, practical considerations also suggest that the pure arbitral model
is superior to a model precluding classwide arbitration because it restores
the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants in arbitration so
that it resembles that existing in litigation by permitting plaintiffs to join
collectively to seek redress. This is especially significant where the
claims involve small dollar amounts, rendering it uneconomical for con-
sumers or employees to pursue individual arbitrations. The aggressive-
ness of corporate drafters leveraging arbitration to insulate companies
from class actions altogether has resulted in a nascent unconscionability
436backlash certain to continue. Fundamentally, the decisions finding no-
class action clauses unconscionable437 are consistent with the spirit of the
analysis of the Keating court that classwide arbitration is superior to the
elimination of plaintiffs' rights to sue collectively altogether.438 Adop-
tion of a pure arbitral paradigm for classwide arbitration can provide the
substantial benefits of arbitration 439 without sacrificing the important
benefits of the class action device.
1. Courts are Unlikely to Vacate Arbitrators' Decisions Permitting
Classwide Arbitration
Following Bazzle, arbitrators, and not courts, will determine
whether a classwide arbitration is appropriate under any given contract.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle gives little guidance as to how
the arbitrator should decide the contract interpretation issue, other than to
say it is "not completely obvious" how arbitrators should interpret an
agreement that is silent regarding classwide arbitration.44 This is be-
cause the Bazzle Court explicitly determined that the matter is one that
the arbitrator, not a court, must address.441 An arbitrator interpreting a
silent arbitration clause after the Bazzle decision can plausibly decide
that classwide arbitration is appropriate. 44' Under the FAA, such a deci-
436. See supra, Part III, C.
437. See supra, Part 111, C and notes 144-146.
438. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1206-07 (class actions provide an important mechanism for "vindi-
cating rights [of] large groups of persons [with claims] too small to warrant individual litigation.
[Prohibiting class actions regarding such claims allows the] unscrupulous wrongdoer to retain the
benefits of its misconduct.") (citations omitted).
439. LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 3, at 7, 17-18 (69% of survey respondents use arbitration
because it saves time and money; 60.5 % of survey respondents find arbitration has a more satisfac-
tory process. One respondent indicated "Arbitration is cheaper [than litigation], faster, confidential,
final, and binding. What more can I say?").
440. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451.
441. Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 153, at 1270.
442. Lawrence J. Bracken 11 & Caroline H. Dixon, AAA Releases Rules on the Administration
of Class Actions, FRANCHISE L.J. 215, 216 (2004); Eric Tuchmann, General Counsel for the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association, announced at the ABA Annual Convention Ultimate Arbitration Update
in August 2004 that in the majority of claims for classwide arbitration, arbitrators had made rulings
allowing classwide arbitration. Robert Davidson, Executive Director of JAMS Arbitration Practice
predicted that arbitrators could also find clauses precluding classwide arbitration unconscionable and
permit classwide arbitrations to proceed. JAMS recently announced that it will not enforce class
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sion is subject only to the narrow review circumscribed by the vacatur
provisions.443 This raises the question whether courts will uphold a de-
termination by an arbitrator that classwide arbitration is appropriate or
whether parties opposed to arbitration can persuade courts upon review
of the arbitrator's determination that a ruling in favor of classwide arbi-
tration demonstrates a "manifest disregard of the law."444  This section
discusses the scope of the court's review of arbitrator decisions in the
context of classwide arbitration and concludes that courts are unlikely to
vacate an arbitrator's decision permitting classwide arbitration. 445
A determination by an arbitrator that classwide arbitration is per-
missible will be reviewed upon completion of the arbitration under FAA
Section 10, which provides only narrow grounds for vacating an arbitra-
tor's decision.446  The limited scope of judicial review of arbitration
awards reflects a "strong policy supporting finality of arbitration awards
and minimal judicial interference with the judgments of arbitrators.
Arbitration awards are "significantly more 'bulletproof than court judg-
ments" and most courts "tend to confirm and enforce awards."" 8  The
statutory and judicial principles allowing review "operate on a presump-
tion of correctness for arbitration awards, or at least an unwillingness on
the part of courts to engage in searching review of such awards."
449
The FAA does not permit review upon the bases of erroneous find-
ings of fact or misinterpretation of law.450  Instead, the standards of re-
action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements. Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Takes Steps to
Ensure Fairness in Consumer Arbitrations (November 12, 2004). As of the date of publication of this
article, AAA is not accepting classwide arbitration claims where the arbitration clause precludes
classwide arbitration. American Arbitration Association Policy on Class Arbitrations, available at
http://www adr.org.ArbitrationPolicy.
443. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004).
444. WARE I, supra note 15, at 94.
445. Bracken & Dixon, supra note 442, at 216; Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 153, at 1270
("defendant could face a more difficult appeal than if a court had made such rulings.").
446. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). The procedural grounds for vacating an arbitration award are
similar under the Uniform Arbitration Act and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. BENNETr,
supra note 34, at 38. Under rules pending promulgation by JAMS, arbitrator's rulings will be re-
viewed consistent with the provisions of the FAA. Under the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbi-
tration, interim review of arbitrator decisions is permitted. American Arbitration Association, Sup-
plernentary Rules for Class Arbitration, Rule 1(c), Rule 3 (permitting interim judicial review of the
Clause Construction Award, pursuant to which the arbitrator determines whether classwide arbitra-
tion is appropriate, given the substance of the parties arbitration agreement), Rule 5(d) (permitting
judicial review of the Class Determination Award, pursuant to which the arbitrator determines
whether to certify the putative class) available at http://www.adr.orgsp.asp?id=2136; See e.g.,
American Arbitration Association, Clause Construction Award of Arbitration: Cole Rests. v. Long
John Silver's., Inc. 10 (2004) (finding the arbitration clause does not prohibit classwide arbitration,
and staying further proceedings for 30 days to allow "any party an opportunity to appeal this
award.") available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1659.
447. THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH ED., AM. BAR ASs'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST:
SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS 282 (2001).
448. Id.
449. BENNETT, supra note 34, at 26.
450. Booth v. Hume Publ'g, Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 932-33 (lIth Cir. 1990); Amicizia Societa
Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960);
STIPANOWICH, supra note 447, at 282.
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view are directed at ensuring fair process, to maximize finality, and mini-
mize "second-guessing by courts. 4 51 There are four statutory grounds
for vacatur of an arbitration award. First, the award is subject to vacatur
if "procured by corruption, fraud or undue means[.], '452  A court may
also vacate an award where "evident partiality or corruption" by the arbi-
trator exists. 453 Vacatur is also available for misconduct on the part of
the arbitrator, including "refusing to postpone the hearing" or in "re-
fusing to hear" relevant evidence, or "any other misbehavior" prejudicial
to a party's rights.454 Finally, vacatur is possible where "the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them" that a true
award on the matter "was not made.
' 455
The grounds for review of an arbitration award under the Uniform
Arbitration Act ("UAA"), adopted by many states, are similarly very
limited.4 56 Under the UAA, the court is empowered to vacate an arbitra-
tion award only under the following circumstances: (1) the award was
procured by fraud, corruption or other undue means; (2) the arbitrators
exceeded their powers; (3) an arbitrator was biased or corrupt; (4) the
arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing where due cause therefore was
shown; (5) the arbitrators refused to consider material evidence; or (6)
there was no valid agreement to arbitrate.457 The UAA further provides
that the fact that a court would not have granted the relief requested is
not a valid basis for vacatur of an arbitrator's award.458
Under federal law, the judicially created grounds for review of arbi-
trator's awards include (1) the award violates public policy; (2) the
award is arbitrary or capricious; and (3) the award manifestly disregards
the law.4 59 These judicially created bases are sometimes described as
independent grounds, and are used as examples of the statutory standard
for vacatur based on arbitrators exceeding their powers.4 ° Judicial re-
view based on an arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law is extremely
narrow46 ' and requires that the arbitrator (1) know the applicable law and
(2) intentionally disregarded applicable law in rendering the award. 62
Manifest disregard "can be established only where a governing legal
451. STIPANOWICH, supra note 447, at 283.
452. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2000).
453. Id. § 10(a)(2).
454. Id. § 10(a)(3).
455. Id. § 10(a)(4).
456. Bracken & Dixon, supra note 442, at 215-16.
457. UNIFORM ARBrrRATION ACT § 12 (amended 1956), 7 U.L.A. 280-81 (1997).
458. Id. at 280.
459. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). Some commentators suggest
that these judicially created bases for review are simply "re-articulation[s] of § 10(d)'s bar on arbi-
trators exceeding their powers." Herrmann, supra note 3, at n.164.
460. STIPANOWICH, supra note 447, at 283.
461. Id. at 283-84.
462. See Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1216 (2d Cir. 2002).
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principle is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case, and
where the arbitrator ignored it after it was brought to the arbitrator's at-
tention in a way that assures that the arbitrator knew its controlling na-
ture.'A63 Where conflicting authority exists regarding a particular issue,
the arbitrator's disregard of one branch of the law in favor of another is
less likely to be vacated by the courts. 464 "The term 'disregard' implies
that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it."
465
Given these standards, the vacatur of an arbitrator's decision to
permit classwide arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause that is silent
466regarding classwide arbitration is unlikely. First, review of the issue
could occur only after a final award.467 Given the strong policy of final-
ity and minimal judicial interference, a court should be reluctant to set
aside an arbitrator's decision either permitting or denying classwide arbi-
tration. The argument that such an award manifestly disregards the law
will no longer survive, given the manner in which the decision in Bazzle
undermines the prior contract interpretation rationale and given the exis-
tence of the law supporting the proposition that contractually precluding
classwide arbitration is both procedurally and substantively unconscion-
able. No longer is there "controlling law" prohibiting classwide arbitra-
tion.
One might argue that the "governing law" only directs the arbitrator
to decide whether classwide arbitration is proper, i.e., a rather narrow
interpretation of the Bazzle holding. However, the counter proposition-
that Bazzle permits an arbitrator to determine that a silent arbitration
clause permits classwide arbitration - seems far more compelling in view
of the language in the Bazzle plurality opinion that explicitly undermines
Champ's contract interpretation rationale.468 If it is "not completely
clear" that a broad, silent arbitration clause prohibits classwide arbitra-
tion, then it is plausible that such a clause permits such a procedure.
One might also argue that Bazzle is a plurality decision, and that the
significance of the decision is limited accordingly. However, given the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Bazzle holding in Pedcor-that class-
wide arbitration is permissible-it cannot be argued that there is a clear
governing legal principle contrary to classwide arbitration. More likely,
463. GMS Group L.L.C. v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Goldman, 306
F.3d at 1216).
464. BENNETT, supra note 34, at 124.
465. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930,933 (2d Cir. 1986).
466. Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933.
467. Cf. American Arbiration Association, Supplementary Class Arbitration Rules 3 and 6
(permitting interim reviews of arbitrator's rulings), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
468. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451.
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a reviewing court evaluating an arbitrator's final award in a classwide
arbitration under FAA Section 10 will find that a determination allowing
classwide arbitration is within the arbitrator's authority.
C. The Hybrid Model of Classwide Arbitration Requiring Ongoing Judi-
cial Involvement is Implicitly Rejected by Bazzle and Preempted by
Federal Law
In the world of classwide arbitration, at least one defendant has ob-
jected to the hybrid procedure of classwide arbitration on the grounds
that the court's order compelling hybrid classwide arbitration was incon-
sistent with the intentions of the parties who agreed to arbitration rather
than the "hybrid" procedure mandating continuing court involvement.46 9
That court declined to address the matter, finding it premature, since
class arbitration had not yet been ordered to occur.470 This Part answers
that question and concludes that the hybrid model for classwide arbitra-
tion fails to withstand scrutiny under federal preemption analysis and is
rejected implicitly by Bazzle.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the facts in Bazzle signals that the
Court will not tolerate the degree of interference with arbitration author-
ized by the hybrid model. The plurality opinion in Bazzle required re-
mand of the matter to an arbitrator to decide whether the arbitrator
should handle the arbitration on a classwide basis. 47 1 While the arbitrator
had already made that determination, answering in the affirmative in one
of the two companion cases, the Supreme Court questioned whether the
court's ruling might have influenced the arbitrator's decision.472 Finding
that the matter was one that the parties agreed an arbitrator would decide,
the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the matter to permit the arbitrator to
decide, uninfluenced by the court.473 Certainly if the arbitrator should
render this threshold decision regarding classwide arbitration, the exer-
cise of discretion of courts to permit classwide arbitration under the hy-
brid model cannot survive. The Garcia court seems to acknowledge
this.
474
Taking the analysis suggested by Bazzle to the next logical step, one
must infer that a court no longer retains authority to decide class action-
related issues previously addressed by courts using the hybrid model,
including class certification, notice, discovery and settlement. 475 The
rationale for the Bazzle plurality's opinion is that the parties agreed to
469. Blue Cross, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 64.
470. Id. The issue in Blue Cross officially before the court was the prospect of discovery
regarding class certification. Id. at 47.
471. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451.
472. Id. at 454.
473. Id.
474. See Garcia, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 303 n.2.
475. See supra Part IV.
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have an arbitrator, and not a court, decide all of their disputes and to limit
the aspects of those disputes that would come before the court to "certain
gateway matters. 'A76 This reasoning is equally applicable to restrict the
court's ability to decide all class action-related issues previously ad-
dressed by courts operating under the hybrid model. Such an inference is
consistent with Pedcor, Garcia and Wood. Under the reasoning of Baz-
zle and its progeny, there is no rationale for continued court involvement
in the class-related aspects of a classwide arbitration proceeding.
Nor does the hybrid model survive scrutiny under preemption
analysis. The hybrid model of classwide arbitration grafts an anti-
arbitration aspect onto the arbitral process, by requiring or permitting
courts to handle certain aspects of class claims during arbitration.47 7
Such an approach contradicts the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA and
the national policy favoring arbitration4 78 by restricting the arbitrator
from handling certain aspects of a classwide arbitration,479 even though
the parties agreed generally to arbitrate all of their disputes. The hybrid
model of classwide arbitration also violates the spirit of the FAA and
federal arbitration law by requiring or permitting a judicial forum for the
resolution of certain aspects of the parties' disputes, 48 in violation of the
rule announced in Southland.4 8'
Because the hybrid model of classwide arbitration negates the
parties' agreement, the law creating it "stands as an obstacle" to the pur-
poses of the FAA in that the hybrid model renders the parties' agreement
to arbitrate their disputes less than fully enforceable. By undermining
the enforceability of the arbitration clause with respect to class claims,
the hybrid model of classwide arbitration places agreements to arbitrate
class actions (which are not fully enforceable under the hybrid model) on
unequal footing with other agreements to arbitrate disputes (which, under
federal arbitration law, are fully enforceable).
Just as courts have invalidated numerous other state laws requiring
more "protection" or "process" than arbitration provides, so too should
courts determine that the hybrid model singles out the arbitration of class
actions for specialized treatment, and therefore is preempted by federal
arbitration law.
The hybrid model undercuts both major principles underlying the
FAA and federal arbitration law. First, the hybrid model undermines the
fundamental policy underlying the FAA to enforce the parties' agree-
476. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451-52.
477. See supra, Part IV.
478. Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 727 (8th Cir. 2001).
479. Stemlight I, supra note 133, at 39.
480. Keating, 31 Cal. 3d at 613; Lewis, 179 Cal. App. 3d. at 940-41; Izzi, 186 Cal. App. 3d at
1321-22; Dickler, 596 A.2d at 866-67.
481. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
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ments to arbitrate by negating the parties' agreement to an arbitral forum,
and instead imposing ongoing judicial involvement to the extent deemed
appropriate by a court with continuing jurisdiction. Second, as I have
shown above, the hybrid system of classwide arbitration does not con-
quer, but more likely derives from and perpetuates the distrust of arbitra-
tion.
Analysis under Professor Drahozal's preemption model yields the
same unqualified result.4 82 Applying the first test,483 the state law creat-
ing the hybrid model of classwide arbitration fails because it does not
apply to contracts generally, but singles out arbitration contracts for spe-
cial treatment. Because the hybrid procedure for classwide arbitration
applies only to arbitration, it is preempted.
Applying the second test,484 even the selection of state law will not
save the hybrid model from preemption. First, courts construe the par-
ties' option to select state law narrowly, so that arguably a generic choice
of law provision incorporates only state contract law, and not state arbi-
tration law.485 Other courts, including Pedcor, construe the standard
choice of state law to includefederal arbitration law, which applies to the
states.486 Finally, as Pedcor recognizes, where parties select state law
that conflicts with federal arbitration law, for example, by requiring a
judicial forum for the resolution of a dispute that the parties agreed to
arbitrate, that state law is preempted.487
Applying the third test under Professor Drahozal's model,48 s the hy-
brid model invalidates, at least in part, the parties' arbitration agreement,
by requiring or permitting a judicial determination regarding class ac-
tion-related issues. The restriction of these class action aspects of the
parties' disputes from arbitration is premised on the rationale that arbitral
resolution of such matters is inappropriate. Under the better view, the
hybrid model is preempted under this test as well.
Under the alternative preemption theories, the hybrid model fares
no better. Under the Keystone Theory, the hybrid model is preempted
because it nullifies the parties' agreement to arbitrate, at least partially.
489
Under the RUAA Theory, because the hybrid model of classwide arbitra-
tion negates the essence of the agreement to arbitrate, to the extent that
482. See discussion supra, Part VI, A (outlining Professor Drahozal's analytical framework).
483. Drahozal II, supra note 308, at 407-08.
484. Id. at 411-13.
485. Id. at 413.
486. Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 361-62.
487. Id.
488. Drahozal I, supra note 308, at 408.
489. Id. at 417.
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the procedure enforced no longer consists purely of "arbitration," the
hybrid is preempted.490
Under the Pro-Contract Theory, the hybrid model is preempted be-
cause it conflicts with the parties' fundamental agreement to arbitrate
their disputes.491  Under Professor Drahozal's Anti-FAA Theory, the
hybrid fails because it is inconsistent with the FAA.492  And under the
FAA Exclusivity Theory, the hybrid model fails because it is a state-
created law that singles out arbitration. 49
The AAA's Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration accommo-
date the hybrid model by providing that arbitrators will follow court or-
ders on certain of the class action-related matters designated for decision
by arbitrators.494 The AAA's Rules also provide for judicial involvement
in classwide arbitration after the order compelling arbitration and prior to
the final award which courts are authorized to review on a motion to
49-5vacate. While these rules are consistent with the hybrid model pursu-
ant to which courts retain ongoing jurisdiction to supervise classwide
arbitrations, such procedures are inconsistent with Bazzle and the FAA,
which do not authorize interim review or appeal of arbitrators' deci-
496sions. Allowing such judicial involvement is not only inconsistent
with the FAA and with the spirit of federal arbitration law, but also un-
dermines some of the fundamental benefits of arbitration such as avoid-
ing the expense and delays inherent in litigation, including the lengthy
appellate process.497
Despite the conceptual desirability of state experimentation with
classwide arbitration procedure where the FAA is silent, federal arbitra-
tion law preempts the hybrid model and the Bazzle decision implicitly
negates continuing court involvement in classwide arbitration. Together
these developments sound a death knell for classwide arbitration under
490. Id.
491. Id. at 419.
492. Id. at 418-19.
493. Id. at 419-20.
494. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, Rule 1(c),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
495. Id., Rule 3 (permitting interim judicial review of the Clause Construction Award, pursuant
to which the arbitrator determines whether classwide arbitration is appropriate, given the substance
of the parties arbitration agreement); Rule 5(d) (permitting judicial review of the Class Determina-
tion Award, pursuant to which the arbitrator determines whether to certify the putative class). See
also, American Arbitration Association, Clause Construction Award of Arbitration: Cole v. Long
John Silver's Rests., Inc. 10 (June 15, 2004) (finding the arbitration clause does not prohibit class-
wide arbitration, and staying further proceedings for 30 days to allow "any party an opportunity to
appeal this award.") available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id= 1659.
496. Judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to the grounds set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10.
497. LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 3, at 7, 17-18 (68% of survey respondents use arbitration
because it saves time and money; 60.5% of survey respondents find arbitration has a more satisfac-
tory process. One respondent indicated "Arbitration is cheaper [than litigation] faster, confidential,
final and binding. What more can I say?"); DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note 41,
at 7 (69% of survey respondents use arbitration because it saves time and money; 61% of survey
respondents find arbitration provides a more satisfactory process).
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the hybrid model and bring the pure arbitral model of classwide arbitra-
tion closer to fruition.
VII. CONCLUSION
The continuing expansion of both arbitration and class actions, the
Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle, the promulgation of class action
arbitration rules by arbitration providers, the expansion of the preemptive
scope of federal arbitration law, and the growing chorus of cases finding
that class action waivers violate public policy and are unenforceable or
unconscionable, all foreshadow the impending expansion of classwide
arbitration under a pure arbitral model. The dual rationales of the case
law prohibiting classwide arbitration are undermined fatally by Bazzle. In
addition, the hybrid model of classwide arbitration is no longer viable
because it violates the spirit of the FAA to the extent the hybrid model
requires ongoing judicial involvement in the class action aspects of an
arbitration proceeding. To the extent that the AAA's new classwide arbi-
tration rules facilitate the hybrid model, they too are flawed.
The reluctance of courts to cede the arbitration of class actions en-
tirely to the arbitration process is a vestige of the historic animosity of
the legal community toward private arbitration that violates the spirit of
the Bazzle decision and the preemptive scope of federal arbitration law.
Adoption of a pure arbitral paradigm for classwide arbitration will elimi-
nate the hybrid approach and align classwide arbitration most closely
with the FAA and with Bazzle and its progeny. Such an approach re-
stores to the arbitral forum the balance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants existing in the judicial setting, and offers the most equitable
solution for preserving the benefits of arbitration.
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